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Not many days after Easter Sunday in the Spring of 1987, Reno police
arrested a seventy-year-old man for "molesting a terminally ill 12 year-old
boy who is mentally retarded and cannot speak."' The man surrendered to
police after a nurse reported seeing the man expose himself to the boy while
the boy was receiving treatment at Riverside Hospital for Skilled Care in
Reno. A month earlier, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the convic-
tion of a 49 year-old man for the crimes of rape, sodomy and sexual abuse of
four boys and one girl, ages 3 and 4, who had been attending a day care
center.2 And finally, a 41 year-old Boy Scout leader confessed to raping or
sodomizing at least 37 children. All three of these cases could be seen as
evidence of what appears to be an increasing amount of child abuse through-
out the United States. But these cases evidence a more shocking predica-
ment: the seventy-year-old molester and the Boy Scout leader who abused
37 children were ordained Roman Catholic priests, while the man convicted
of abusing children ages 3 and 4 was a Methodist minister. All were clergy,
older, professional, well-respected, trusted, and vowed to avoid even the con-
templation of the crimes with which each was involved.
Especially during the last twenty years, law, medicine, religion and soci-
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America; B.A., La Salle College;
J.D., University of Virginia; M.Ch.A., D.Min., The Catholic University of America; Visiting
Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Roman Catholic Priest, Archdiocese
of Washington.
1. L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1987, at 28, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1987, at B5, col. 4.
3. Roman Catholic Church Discusses Abuse of Children by Priests, N.Y. Times, May 4,
1986, § 1, at 26, col. 1; Priest's Child-Molestation Case Traumatizes Catholic Community, Wash.
Post, June 9, 1985, at A6; col. 1. While the Reverend Gilbert Gauthe entered a plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity to felony charges of sexually abusing children, he admitted the
abuse, which lasted over a long period of time. In 1972, the parents of two boys confronted the
priest with the abuse of their child and he agreed to counseling, but no one told his superiors.
According to sworn statements, the bishop first heard of the child abuse two years later. But it
was not until 1983-nine years later-that the priest was suspended from his duties by his
superiors. See Church Still On Trial in Pedophilia Crisis, May 30, 1986, Nat'l Cath. Rep., at 1,
col. 1.
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ety, have been asked to respond to this predicament. What assessment can
we make at this time? All indications are that the cases just described are
but the discovered few. Newspapers record the pleas and lower court trials
of other clergy arrested for pedophilia.4 Other articles, books and televised
interviews suggest that the predicament of pedophilia among clergy,' evi-
dences more stringent reporting requirements, greater sexual promiscuity,
increased awareness among children of what constitutes sexual abuse and
perhaps a relativity applied to the values inherent in the religion of the
cleric. Whatever the sociological cause of the dramatic evidence of
pedophile clergy, the fact itself has challenged the medical community to
4. A 47 year-old former priest who volunteered as a basketball coach at a Catholic
school in Washington D.C., pleaded guilty to sodomizing a minor and to sexually abusing six
other boys more than fifty times during six years. Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1986, at Bl, col. 1. The
forty-one year old former pastor of a Catholic parish in Barstow, California, pleaded no con-
test to a misdemeanor charge of molesting an altar boy. L.A. Times, May 6, 1987, § 1, at 2, col.
3. A priest in Rhode Island pleaded no contest to 26 charges of sexually assaulting boys. N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1986, at A14, col. 5. In Orange County, California, a 34 year old priest was
charged with molesting an undisclosed number of altar boys during a 13 month period. He
was eventually convicted of 26 counts of fondling children, but not nudity. L.A. Times, Apr.
27, 1986, § 1, at 2, col. 5; L.A. Times, Nov. 30, 1986, § 2, at 5, col. 2. In Newark, New Jersey,
a 56 year-old Catholic priest pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting three boys, then ages 10 to 12.
The boys were students at a parochial school where the priest had worked for 27 years. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 5,1987, at A23, col. 6. In suburban Washington D.C., a 34 year-old priest admit-
ted to problems with drugs and alcohol and to sexually abusing three teens in five incidents
from 1981 through 1985. Wash . Post, Dec. 23, 1986, at A6, col. 1.
5. The definition of clergy is important. Twenty-four states specifically define the term;
25 compile a list of persons considered a part of the designation; Louisiana, Nevada, and
Rhode Island, make no specific definition but allow for the privilege. The term is always
associated with religions, the exact definition will depend upon the particular religion involved.
For purposes of this article where we are primarily concerned with the Roman Catholic
Church, the definition of clergy shall include: "A person becomes a cleric through the recep-
tion of diaconate and is incardinated into the particular church or personal prelature for whose
service he has been advanced." 1983 Code c. 266, § 1. Furthermore, "[a]fter it has been val-
idly received, sacred ordination never becomes invalid. A cleric, however, loses his clerical
state:
1. by a judicial decision or administrative decree which declares the invalidity of
sacred ordination;
2. by the legitimate infliction of the penalty of dismissal;
3. by a rescript of the Apostolic see which is granted by the Apostolic see to dea-
cons only for serious reasons and to presbyters only for the most serious reasons.
Id. at c. 290. See In re Murtha 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889 (1971), where a nun attempted
to invoke the priest-penitent privilege when asked to testify to confessions made to her by a
member of the church. The court denied the privilege since Murtha was not a "clergyman"
within the definition of the N. J. statute nor the canons of the religion. Id. at 383, 279 A.2d at
892. See also, Masquat v. McGuire, 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981) (nun was not acting as a
spiritual advisor but rather as an administrator and thus could not invoke the statute). But see,
Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (where a nun was acting as a spiri-
tual director, she was within the general definition of clergyman and was entitled to use the
privilege).
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estimate the cause and cure, and the legal process to assess crime and
punishment.
Medical advances have conditioned Americans to think that science can
cure anything. Even when faced with the catastrophe of AIDS, many
knowledgeable Americans continue to practice unsafe sex practices, often
with the assumption that science will eventually find a cure that will save
them. So too with pedophilia: there must be a cure. But what if there is no
cure for pedophilia?6 Science does offer treatment that includes psychother-
apy, behavior therapy, surgery, and medication,7 but the current assessment
is that, "there is little convincing evidence that the traditional psychothera-
pies alone are an effective means for treating pedophilia." No other modal-
ity offers a cure either. Thus, if there is no cure, what is a church superior to
do with an ordained cleric who has taken vows of poverty, chastity and obe-
dience "now and forever"? Can appointment ever be made to a ministerial
function that invites association with children? Should permission be denied
to even wear traditional clerical clothing-a penalty in itself under church
law-if such clothing invites the trust of children? How is that religious
church superior to reconcile the sacramental and scriptural doctrine of for-
giveness with the legal necessity of due care? Medicine occupies an essential
place in the predicament of clergy and pedophilia, but as yet it offers no
panacea.
The legal process offers only consequences, criminal and civil, and there is
every indication that the consequences shall continue as they have in the last
twenty years: increasing punishment and civil penalties. The scope of this
Article includes only that portion of child abuse that is sexual in nature,
6. For purposes of this article,
"the term pedophilia will be used when referring to persons sexually oriented to-
wards children, regardless of whether the children are pre- or postpubertal... [This
definition includes three elements:] First, it is necessary to establish that the patient
becomes erotically excited by the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activities with
children. Secondly, if the patient is an adult, rather than adolescent, the children
must be at least ten years his junior. Finally, it must be clear that any sexual acts
engaged in with children are not either due to other mental disorders such as schizo-
phrenia, dementia or drug intoxication, or due to the lack of a suitable age-appropri-
ate partner, which occurs in some cases of incarceration or incest."
Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Biomedical Perspective and a Status Report on Biomedical Treatment,
in THE SEXUAL AGGRESSOR, CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON TREATMENT 83, 86-87 (1983).
Throughout any discussion of pedophilia in the United States, references will constantly be
made to Dr. Fred S. Berlin, M.D., Ph.D. He is Associate Professor, School of Medicine, Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. He is also co-Director of the Johns Hopkins Hospital
Sexual Disorders Clinic and a member of the American College of Forensic Psychiatry.
7. BERLIN & KROUT, PEDOPHILIA: DIAGNOSTIC CONCEPTS, TREATMENT, AND ETHI-
CAL CONSIDERATIONS 7 (1983) [hereinafter BERLIN & KROUT, PEDOPHILIA].
8. Id.
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hence defined as pedophilia. But society makes no distinction between the
sexual pedophile and the physical abuser, even though there is seldom physi-
cal violence associated with pedophilia. Indeed, there is every indication that
society shall react to abuse statistics with more extensive reporting require-
ments, more severe criminal penalties, higher civil awards for negligent or
intentional torts associated with abuse, and greater laxity in the rules of evi-
dence associated with privilege or children.9
Society, and the legal apparatus associated with it, shall certainly continue
the trend begun in 1962 of protecting children from every type of abuse.'0
But as society justifiably penalizes every instance of abuse, including
pedophilia, protected freedoms and prerogatives associated with clergy and
religion are affected. For instance, for twenty-five years, states have been
legislating reporting requirements," mandating who must report instances
of child abuse to the authorities. Today not only has the definition of abuse
been expanded to include physical abuse, mental, emotional and sexual
abuse, but also states have expanded the classes of persons who must report.
Early statutes contained reporting requirements for physicians, but to-
day's statutes require most professionals to report. 12 In fact, the modem
statutes address the following: First, who must report; second, reportable
conditions; third, reporters' immunity; fourth, penalties for failure to report;
9. The fact that the San Diego County district attorney was willing to charge a mother
with fetal abuse when her child was born brain dead, is an indication of the extent to which
society's concern over child abuse has expanded. See, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1986, at A17, col. 1.
Also, during the final weeks of its 1987 session, the Supreme Court decided in Kentucky v.
Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (1987), that defendants in child abuse cases "do not have a constitu-
tional right to be present at hearings held to determine a child's competency to testify." See,
Wash. Post, Jun. 20, 1987, at A14, col. 1.
10. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, THE
ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORT-
ING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963). More recent examples: I. SLOAN, CHILD
ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW & LEGIS. LEGAL ALMANAC SERIES No. 79, (1983) [hereinafter I.
SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE]; John, Child Abuse-The Battered Child Syndrome in 2 AM. JUR. 2d
PROOF OF FACTS, § 14-24, at 415-26 (1974 & Supp. 1986).
11. The earliest reporting statutes required physicians to report suspected cases of abuse
because it was assumed that physicians would most frequently be the first to see such harm to a
child. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 66, 67-68 (1965).
12. See I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE supra note 10, at 17-31; see also the Federal Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 0982 & Supp. 1985). In the area of
family law, the federal government often provides the impetus for states to draft legislation to
address a particular problem. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 Pub. L.
98-378, requiring the states to have enforcement procedures to collect support payments for
children. Also, as it relates to the states' use of custody determinations under any one state's
adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, pertinent is the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 ("PKPA"), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A (Spec. Pamp. 1981).
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and fifth, the abrogation or application of certain privileges. '3 Must a cleric
report abuse? An ordained cleric could certainly be considered a profes-
sional, but is matter told in a confessional setting subject to reporting? What
is a confessional setting? Can failure to report result in criminal penalties
under the act, or even civil damages because failure to report is negligence
per se? And if the state has always privileged any communications between
such professionals as priest-penitent, should that privilege be allowed when
the offense is as serious as child abuse? The needs of society, the inability of
science to provide a definitive cure, and the constitutional and traditional
prerogatives allowed clergy, have created a modem predicament for which
there is no easy solution.
This Article identifies the present posture of child abuse and admits that
the incidence of child sexual abuse among members of the clergy is docu-
mental. Indeed, incidents of child abuse seem to be more common each day
throughout all segments of the population. This has affected public trust and
the public has responded by revoking such traditional clerical prerogatives
as the priest-penitent privilege, developing a theory of abuse in gestation,
and demanding better treatment for offenders through therapy.
The precise scope of this Article is to offer recommendations concerning
the legal, medical and social predicament of pedophilia regarding issues that
affect clergy. Rather than avoid the issue, the Article further admits that
society is justified in seeking redress through the criminal process and that
victims are entitled to fair compensation in the civil courts. Clerics are not
immune from this redress. Nonetheless, the focus of the Article is upon rec-
ommendations that will address the needs of all involved. Because children
are involved, emotions can predominate, but when asking legislators and so-
ciety to address the predicament, reason must predominate.' 4 Thus, Part I
will address the issue of abuse; Part II the medical evidence available to
13. Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the Clergy
Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 728 [hereinafter Mitchell, Must
Clergy Tell?]. This article is an excellent summary of the yet to be decided issue of whether
clergy may be forced to report under these reporting statutes when the clergy claims the com-
munication is privileged.
14. One of the leading researchers in the medical field of pedophilia is Fred S. Berlin,
M.D., Ph.D. He stresses the need to address the ethical response to the person who is defined
as a pedophile. When writing about this emotional issue he writes:
The values we try to instill in our children are important. Almost two thousand years
ago as an outraged crowd attempted to stone to death a woman whose sexual behav-
ior they considered offensive, one man stepped forward to stop the retribution, speak-
ing against such revenge while espousing values such as compassion, understanding,
forgiveness, and reformation. He asked that persons be judged not simply .by their
behavior but with some appreciation for their humanity.
BERLIN & KROUT, PEDOPHILIA, supra note 7, at 11.
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address the problem; Part III the criminal and civil law violations; and fi-
nally, Part IV will offer recommendations.
I. THE ISSUE OF ABUSE
Emotion can predominate when speaking of religion or children; when
the two are in conflict, reason can suffer. Thus, "[T]he choice between jailing
clergy and giving up evidence of child abuse must be a dire one."'" The
proponents of religion and the sanctity of such sacramental institutions as
confession or confessional counseling are often on one side of the issue, while
persons seeking to protect the rights of children are on the other. Nonethe-
less, reducing this painful and complicated predicament to such a simplistic
conflict is superficial16 and shall surely result in confusion and litigation 7
when challenge comes from either the religious or the child protective fac-
tion. But today there seems to be such overwhelming evidence of child
abuse that reason may suffer. The New York Times quotes Dr. A. Nicholas
Groth, Director of the Sex Offender Program at the Connecticut Correc-
tional Institute, as saying: "The dimensions of the abuse are staggering."' 8
Dr. Groth has studied 1,000 child molesters over the past 16 years and when
he considers the number of children affected by the molesters, he admits,
"[I]f we saw these same numbers of children suddenly developing some kind
of illness, we'd thik we had a major epidemic on our hands."' 9
Child sexual abuse also seems to be a national problem. The American
Humane Association's national survey of state child protection statistics
shows a 200 percent increase in the reporting of sexual abuse since 1976.
Furthermore, studies show that most incidents are unreported. "But a new
15. Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell?, supra note 13, at 723.
16. Professor Mary Harter Mitchell, supra note 13, initiates her article concerning the
child abuse reporting requirements of clergy by exposing the "superficiality of characterizing
the conflict between clergy privilege and child abuse reporting requirements as a choice be-
tween protecting secrets and protecting children." Id. at 724. Rather, she states: "Given the
momentous interests potentially at stake, the issue should be carefully analyzed ...." Id. at
824. "The resolvers of the dilemma must proceed with informed concern for the children,
with sensitivity to the less perceptible values of free religious practice and the beneficence of
effective ministries, and with the appropriate humility concerning anyone's abilities either to
judge or to effect a child's best interests." Id. at 824.
17. See, e.g., Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985). The State of Texas abro-
gates all privilege when it comes to reporting child abuse except that between attorney and
client: "In any proceeding regarding the abuse or neglect of a child or the cause of any abuse or
neglect, evidence may not be excluded on the ground of privileged communications except in
the case of communications between attorney and client." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04
(Vernon 1986).
18. Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1982, at
C l, col. I.
19. Id.
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study of sexual offenders shows that each was responsible for completing or
attempting an average of 68 child molestations. This was three times the
average number of rapes of adult women attempted by those offenders stud-
ied."2 Indeed, Dr. Gene G. Abel, who is a professor of clinical psychiatry
at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, states that
offenders "molest many more children than had previously been suspected,
and child molestation is a more frequent and serious crime than we had
supposed."2 1
Often the sexual abuse is associated with, or assimilated into, other forms
of abuse identified as physical, emotional or mental. Much of the literature
concerning abuse makes no accurate distinctions, but simply refers to "child
abuse" whether the injury is immediate or becomes apparent in the future.22
This makes abuse even more difficult to estimate, with reports ranging from
a few thousand to over a million incidents per year.23 But all experts agree
that the problem is serious and the actual amount of abuse is higher than
that reported.24
The age of the child invites particular import because society will be more
20. Id. The study was done by Dr. Gene G. Abel, Director of the Sexual Behavior Clinic
of the N.Y. State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in Manhat-
tan. There were 192 male child molesters studied so as to assist in developing a model treat-
ment program. Previously the Clinic studied 238 male sex offenders in New York and
Memphis and of these people studied, they had attempted or completed 16,666 acts of child
molestation.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., HURT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE
RESEARCH 11-12 (1979) [hereinafter HURT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT] (description of the
results of child abuse and neglect); EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE
AND DELINQUENCY (R. Hunner and Y. Walker, eds. 1981). Particularly with child sexual
abuse, the effects are often not immediate, but only manifested in some other anti-social behav-
ior in the future. Causality between child sexual abuse and future such abuse by victims is
apparent. I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE, supra note 10 at 1-14 (offers an outline of the categories of
abuse and the indications of each). See also, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (5th ed. 1979).
23. Christiansen, Educational and Psychological Problems of Abused Children 13 (1980)
[hereinafter CHRISTIANSEN]. See also, DELEGATE WORKBOOK, WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
ON FAMILIES, 65 (1980) [hereinafter DELEGATE WORKBOOK]. The statistics presented by the
White House Conference were as follows: "Physical abuse occurred in 22.6% of the reported
cases; sexual abuse in 6.2%; emotional abuse 22.4%; neglect 86.4%; other forms of maltreat-
ment 11%. (These total more than 100% because many children are subject to more than one
form of abuse)."
24. Even though somewhat dated, the White House Conference reported: "Estimates of
child abuse range to more than 1 million cases annually. Reported cases are on the increase -
from 400,000 in 1975 to 600,000 in 1976. In 1975 more than 2,000 children.., were killed by
their parents." One expert states that more children under the age of five die from injuries
inflicted by parents or guardians than from tuberculosis, whooping cough, polio, measles, dia-
betes, rheumatic fever, and appendicitis, combined. DELEGATE WORKBOOK, supra note 23, at
65.
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aggressive in protecting those least able to protect themselves. The age of
the victim ranges from a few weeks to adolescents, but as many as perhaps 51
percent are children under the age of seven. Indeed, a White House Confer-
ence reported that, "[T]he younger the child, the greater the risk of abuse...
Children under the age of three are most vulnerable."25 And while the
abuser can be a person in whom the parents have placed their trust and
confidence, estimates range between 50 to 83 percent of the cases that the
parent is the abuser himself or herself.26 More than likely these are parents
living under stress" such as loss of income, other family violence such as
spouse abuse, or the child was unexpected or now unwanted.28 More often
than not the parent is a child herself (sometimes himself) and also psycho-
logically or emotionally impaired.2 9 Particularly with child sexual abuse,
the parent was abused as a child,3 ° and while most reports and statistics
refer to the male child abuser, women do commit physical, emotional,
mental and sexual abuse.
Society will correctly reflect upon these statistics and conclude that some-
thing must be done. There is an identifiable trend since the early 1960's to
prevent child abuse. This is why the reporting statutes were expanded to
include more reportable circumstances than physical abuse, and the class of
persons who must report was expanded beyond physicians. States began
25. Id. at 65.
26. Christiansen, supra note 23, at 22. The studies placing the percentage at the lower end
have a significant number of unidentified abusers.
27. See, e.g., HURT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 22, at 8-10, for a discussion
of the environmental factors that most commonly contribute to a parent abusing a child.
28. See, e.g., HOROWITZ & DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 266 n. 16 (1984).
The authors cite a study done in 1979 in which nearly 50% of the suspected child abusers were
on welfare or public assistance. They are quoting KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES
245-55 (2d ed. 1974). They stress however that this does not mean that the poor are more
likely to abuse their children, but only that the poor are more likely to be reported because of
the frequent visitations made by social workers. Nonetheless, stress related to loss of income
has been established as contributing to child abuse, perhaps more to physical than sexual.
29. See HURT, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, supra note 22, at 8. "[P]arents of abused
children are typically immature, dependent, impulsive, rigid, self-centered, and rejecting."
Furthermore, researchers have described "the abusive parent as one with personality inade-
quacies .... The parent becomes sadistic in displacing aggression which results from domestic
and marital relationships."
30. For a discussion of the tendency of those who have been abused to abuse others, see
MOYNIHAN, The Changing American Family 35-37 (1979). See also N.Y. Times, May 13,
1982, at CIO, col. 4 where Dr. Groth comments on the reason why a person becomes a
pedophile: "There has usually been trauma or victimization during the offender's formative
years." Of the imprisoned offenders he has studied, 80% of them were themselves sexually
abused as children. "About 25% of these were abused by women - baby sitters, relatives or
caretakers. Often abuse by women isn't usually reported because somehow a young boy is
considered lucky to have a teacher. But these boys do not experience it that way."
31. Some states expressly require clergy to report instances of abuse, using words such as
1988] Pedophilia
allowing for anonymous reporting as long as the reporter acted in good faith,
and immunity was granted for temporary removal of a child from unsafe
circumstances or for taking photographs or x-rays.32 States gave substance
to the duty to report by providing for criminal penalties and a civil liability
in some instances. 33 And states modified traditional privileges between par-
ent-child, doctor-patient, and priest-penitent in the context of child abuse,
retaining only that between the attorney and the client. 4 Indeed, four states
seemed to have ignored the first amendment constitutional issues involved in
free exercise and expressly abrogated the clergy privilege in the context of
child abuse.35
There has therefore been a definite shift in the posture of the public and
the law during the last twenty-five years.36 Child abuse has "come out of the
closet" and with it has come a change in the definition of who must report
"clergyman" or "priest, minister or rabbi." See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38(b)
(1975 & West Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353, 23-9 (1981 & Supp. 1987); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 432B.220(2)(d) (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Supp. 1986). For a
summary of who must report, see e.g., Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Liter-
ature, 8 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1974).
32. See Mawdsley & Permuth, Child Abuse Reporting: A Search for an Acceptable Bal-
ancing of Interests, 9 NOLPE SCH. L.J. 115 (1981).
33. Some states expressly allow for a civil cause of action against a person who has a duty
to report, but who, because he or she failed in that duty, allowed abuse to occur. See e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(4) (1986); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.75 (1985 & West Supp 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.633 (West
Supp. 1986); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 420 (McKinney 1983). Whether a cleric could be liable
for negligence shall be discussed infra Part IV.
34. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986); 8 J. Wigmore, WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2286 (rev. ed. 1961).
35. See generally Note, When Must a Priest Report Under A Child Abuse Reporting Stat-
ute? - Resolution of the Priests' Conflicting Duties, 21 VAL. UNIV. L. REV. 431 (1987). (argues
that the priest-penitent privilege should be retained because it is grounded upon constitutional
considerations). For states that have abrogated the privilege, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-815
(Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F) (West
1987); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060 (3) (1986). It is important to note the recent date of
each of these statutes. The constitutional issues have yet to be addressed, but see Mitchell,
Must Clergy Tell? supra note 13, at 723.
36. In its effort to address the issue of child abuse, society seems particularly willing to
forget the long history of the priest-penitent privilege and the purposes for which it was estab-
lished. For a review of the history, see Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, A
Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Stat-
utes 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (1977-78); Tinnelly, Privileged Communication to Clergymen,
1 CATH. LAW. 198 (1955); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450 (1985); STONE & LIEBMANN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 1.01 (1983); 8 J. WIG-
MORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2286 (rev. ed. 1961); Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the
Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328 (1976); TIEMANN & BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:
PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1983); Regan & Macartney,
Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAW. 3 (1956); POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 132-35 (2d ed. 1898).
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abuse, the conditions that will warranted charges of child abuse, greater im-
munity for reporters so that abuse may be identified, abrogation of certain
sacrosanct privileges, and more severe criminal and civil penalties for failure
to report. While some of these penalties may conflict with constitutional
guarantees and thus their availability made brief, the point is that there has
been a shift in attitude and response. There is no indication that the attitude
of condemnation shall change.
Within this context of the trend towards greater protection of children
from abuse, should be placed increased demands for the protection from
prenatal abuse.3 Separate from the issue of abortion and termination of
pregnancy, courts and legislators today are debating the expansion of abuse
and neglect statutes to protect the unborn human from such abusive acts as
alcohol, narcotics, smoking, refusing medical treatment, and maternal infec-
tions that could result in AIDS or other complications associated with preg-
nancy. Medical advances and scientific studies have made such abuse
liability verifiable and the attention of the public has been drawn to it
through the media 38 and association with postnatal abuse concern.
It is only logical that abuse statutes that centered upon the physical,
mental, emotional or sexual abuse of children would seem applicable to the
abuse of children who had been "harmed" during pregnancy and then been
born with evidence of that "harm." Law reviews have called attention to
this logic. 39 And in the past several years, there has arisen many commenta-
37. The term prenatal means "prior to birth" and refers to both the care of the woman
during pregnancy and the growth and development of the unborn person. See generally,
MOSBY'S MEDICAL AND NURSING DICTIONARY 880 (1983); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 479
(5th. ed. 1979), (the term "en ventre sa mere" means in its mother's womb and commonly
refers to an unborn child). The term "quick child" refers to an unborn child that has grown to
the point where it moves within its mother's womb. Id. at 1122.
38. Both popular media and government publications have drawn attention to prenatal
abuse. See DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF MATERNAL DRUG USAGE DURING PREG-
NANCY, CURRENT RESEARCH ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF MATERNAL DRUG ABUSE, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 59, 96 (1985); APPENDIX-
MATERNAL-FETAL TRANSFER OF ABUSED SUBSTANCES: PHARMACOKINETICS AND PHAR-
MACODYNAMiC DATA, PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE: KINETICS AND DYNAMICS, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 60 at 110 (1985); PLACENTAL TRANS-
FER OF DRUGS, ALCOHOL, AND COMPONENTS OF CIGARETrE SMOKE AND THEIR EFFECTS
ON THE HUMAN FETUS, PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE: KINETICS AND DYNAMICS, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 6098 § 98 (1985); Drugs-
Risks Versus Benefits, PARENT'S MAGAZINE, July 1983, at 77; Can Drinking, Smoking, and
Pills Harm Your Unborn Baby?, GLAMOUR, Oct. 1981, at 77; Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Advisory
Debated, 214 SCIENCE, Nov. 6, 1981, at 642; Drinking For Two-A New Warning To Mothers
To Be, MCCALLS, June 1985, at 37; Boodman, Born Dying. AIDS 2nd Generation, Wash. Post,
Mar. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
39. See Parness, The Abuse and Neglect of the Human Unborn: Protecting Potential Life,
20 FAM. L.Q. 197, 208 (1986); Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can The State Inter-
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ries concerning the emergence of a legal doctrine recognizing fetal legal
rights," and the potential conflict with the rights of the mother, a woman.
41
Indeed, advocates for women's rights are vociferous in their questioning of
the rights of a fetus42 when the health or privacy of the woman-mother is in
conflict. But a distinction can be made between those choices a woman
makes concerning her own health and well being that affect a fetus, and the
choices a woman makes in regards to sexual habits, diet, alcohol and narcot-
ics that affect a fetus. The former is not the subject of this Article nor does it
come under the scrutiny of state abuse statutes. The latter however, is the
arena of abuse and the subject of possible reporting and prosecution of the
woman-mother.43
Surely if legislators and courts are willing to identify and prosecute
mothers' and abrogate traditional immunities as existing between parent-
vene? 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984); Parness & Pritchard, To Be Or Not To Be: Protecting the
Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982); Note, The Law and the Unborn
Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 349 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703 (1986); Johnsen,
The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women's Constitutional Rights; Liberty, Privacy,
and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Note, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The
Right of a Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582 (1976); Parness, The Duty to
Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 431 (1983); Note, Fetal Rights: Defining 'Person' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, U.
ILL. L. REV. 347 (1983); Note, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for
Judicial Intervention, 14 PAC. L.J. 1065 (1983); Lenow, The Fetus as a Patient: Emerging
Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1983).
41. For an article that analyzes fetal rights primarily in light of the medical intervention
and bodily integrity case law, see, Gallagher, Prenatal Invasion & Interventions: What's Wrong
with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Gallagher]. (The author
argues that, "The Caesarean section and other fetal rights' cases possess great symbolic and
precedential significance, but they have less to do with the status of the fetus than with the
moral and legal status of women." Id. at 58.).
42. Robertson, Protective Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Child-
birth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Lifesaving Medical
Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228 (1973);
Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technology and
the Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1980).
43. Some authors seem to make no distinction between medical treatment of the mother
and the mother's use of alcohol, cigarettes, sex or narcotics. See, e.g., Gallagher supra note 41,
at 57-58: "Until the child is brought forth from the woman's body, our relationship with it
must be mediated by her. The alternative adopts a brutally coercive stance toward pregnant
women, viewing them as vessels or means to an end which may be denied the bodily integrity
and self-determination specific to human dignity."
44. The State of California prosecuted Pamela Rae Stewert for the violation of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, which states "that one who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to fur-
nish necessary clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance or other remedial care for his or her
child," is guilty of child abuse. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1987). The case was reported
throughout the media. See, e.g., Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1986, at Al, col. 1; L.A. Daily J., Oct. 8,
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child,45 the prosecution or civil responsibility of other sacrosanct persons is
sure to follow. Thus, fetal abuse debate affects the societal perception or
prosecution of clergy abuse, and any immunity clergy may have enjoyed.
Even those who criticize fetal rights, would admit there is a definite trend
towards affording a legal status for the fetus.46 The unborn human has long
had rights in the law of property and inheritance.47 In 1981, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Auth. ,48 ac-
corded the unborn human legal status in equity. The court upheld a juvenile
court order authorizing the hospital to perform a cesarean section delivery
over the mother's objections on religious grounds. The mother was diag-
nosed with placenta previa and was told that without such an operation
there was a 99 percent certainty the child would not survive vaginal deliv-
ery.49 In identifying its public policy for ordering the cesarean section, the
1986 at I, col. 2, USA Today, Feb. 27, 1987, at A4, col. 1. (Her son, Thomas Travis Edward
Monson, was born brain dead, but the criminal prosecution was dismissed by a San Diego
municipal judge on Feb. 26, 1987 because the Cal. Penal Code Sec. 270 was to be used solely as
a child support statute.)
45. The parental immunity doctrine was judicially created in 1891. In preventing civil suit,
the doctrine stated:
[T]he peace of society, and of the families composing society and a sound public
policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society,
forbid to the minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil
redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 711, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891). See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). But there is a
trend today to abrogate the immunity. See, e.g., Note, Torts, the Abolishment of the Parental
Immunity Doctrine-Children May Recover Damages from Parents in Personal Injury Actions,
11 U. DAYTON L. REV. 737 (1986); 59 AM. JUR. 2d, Parent and Child § 152 (1971); Gelbman
v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (1969). In Gelbman, the court,
in abolishing the immunity doctrine, said the policy to preserve family harmony was removed
by compulsory automobile insurance.
46. While the article does not specifically mention child abuse in utero, the former Direc-
tor of the Civil Liberties & Public Policy Program at Hampshire College writes:
Fetal rights advocates assert that the courts' expansion of causes of action for wrong-
ful death and for injuries sustained in utero indicates a trend toward full legal status
for the fetus. They maintain that the determinative issue in such cases has been the
fetus' biologically independent existence. In this view, the courts have replaced the
traditional birth requirement for tortious liability with a new viability line' that rec-
ognizes the fetus' genetic individuality and its possible capacity for survival before
full term delivery. Id. at 37-38. This author thus argues that any inquiry as to medi-
cal rights of the fetus or any discussion of abuse, should not take place until after the
birth of the fetus.
47. In New York, one court has stated: "It has been the uniform and unvarying decision
of all common law courts in respect to estate matters for at least the past two hundred years
that a child en ventre sa mere is born' and alive' for all purposes for his benefit." In re
Helthausen's Will, 175 Misc. 1022,1024, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941).
48. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
49. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
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court stated that the state had an interest in the life of the unborn, and that
the intrusion into the mother's life was far outweighed by the duty of the
state to protect an unborn from meeting death before being given the oppor-
tunity to live.5° It is important to note that in this very recent case, the court
was willing to afford protection to a fetus, even when this conflicted with the
religious rights of the mother and it involved a medical procedure that came
within the penumbra of privacy.
Criminal law has historically debated the rights of unborn humans5I and
today, in an effort to avoid entanglement with abortion, most states do not
define person as including an unborn human. Because of technological ad-
vancements and arguments such as that of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor in
the dissent to City of Akron v. Akron Health Center for Reproductive
Health,52 where she finds that potential life is no less potential during the
first trimester than it is after the viability of the fetus, there is increasing legal
and medical concern for fetal rights.53 Viability is an arbitrary point in re-
gards to the potentiality of prenatal life. 54 The state should have a compel-
ling interest in protecting potential life throughout a woman's pregnancy.
55
Some states have sought to avoid the abortion controversy, and at the same
time include the fetus in the definition of person. 56 But when seeking to sum-
marize the existing statutes and cases, there is little overt protection of the
50. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
51. The common law historically held that a person administering drugs or medication to
a woman quick with child for the sole purpose of causing a miscarriage is guilty of a misde-
meanor, and if the child was "born alive" but later died as a result of such prenatal injuries, the
crime was murder. PERKINS & BOYCE, 50 CRIM. L. 188 (3d ed. 1982). This common law "born
alive" rule is read as defining another human being as one who has been born and is alive. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 comment 4(c) (1980). New York and Texas are but two of several
states following the "born alive" rule in homicide and explicitly excluding an unborn human
from the definition of person. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(l) (McKinney 1975); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.07 (17) (Vernon 1974).
52. 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2505 (1983). The majority rejected a number of state
requirements that hampered a woman's right to an abortion. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
53. See 462 U.S. at 461.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cal. Penal Code § 187 (West 1984):
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought.
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act which results in
the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Chapter 11 (com-
mencing with Section 25950) of Division 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon's certifi-
cate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a case where, to a
medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be death of the mother of the
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fetus within criminal law." If change is to come, perhaps it will be a result
of developments in tort law.5"
Tort law is more cognizant of prenatal rights today,59 and there is every
reason to think that there will be a continuing trend towards the recognition
of prenatal torts for viable' ° and for not-yet-viable fetuses. 61 Advancement
fetus or where her death from childbirth, although not medically certain, would
be substantially certain or more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of the
fetus. (c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of
any person under any other provision of law.
57. In Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983), the Kentucky Supreme Court
dismissed the charge of murder against the defendant when the man forced his hand up his
estranged wife's vagina and caused the death of her twenty-eight to thirty week old child. The
child was not "born alive" for purposes of the murder statute. Id. at 62. See People v. Greer,
79 III.2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980) (Criminal charge was dismissed when defendant caused
the death of his girlfriend's fetus). But see Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d
1324 (1984), where the Massachusetts court allowed the vehicular homicide statute to include
an unborn human within its definition of "person" even when there was no express statutory
authority. Nonetheless, only "viable" fetuses were "persons." Id.
58. In the area of torts, courts and legislatures are allowing recovery for both pre- and
post-conception torts. See infra note 60. The only reluctance appears to be to allow recovery
prior to conception for fear that such recovery would result in increased litigation, and the
traditional concerns of duty, foreseeability and causation. See generally Collins, An Overview
and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrong-
ful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 2 J. FAM. L. 677 (1983).
59. See, e.g., Note, Parental Liability for Preconception Negligence: Do Parent's Owe a
Legal Duty to their Potential Children? 22 CAL. W. L. REV. 289 (1986). See also Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). Justice Holmes established the "entity the-
ory" which disallowed recovery for prenatal torts since the mother and the child were one
entity-inseparable-and the child could not sue on his or her own behalf. Id. at 63. But see
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), the first case to recognize a legal action by a
viable fetus taken from its mother's womb through professional malpractice. The court's rea-
soning in changing the common law was influenced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Boggs
in Dietrich at 368-74, 56 N.E. at 640-42, and progressing medical technology implicitly recog-
nized by Chief Justice Stone:
If with a discerning eye, we see differences as well as resemblances in the facts and
experiences of the present when compared with those recorded in the precedents, we
take the decisive step toward the achievement of a progressive science of law. If our
appraisals are mechanical and superficial, the law which they generate will likewise
be mechanical and superficial, to become at last but a dry and sterile formalism.
Bonbrest at 142.
60. In Bonbrest the court defined "viable" as a fetus that had reached the stage of develop-
ment which would allow it to live outside the womb. Bonbrest at 140. See generally W. KEE-
TON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 55 (5th ed. 1984); Allaire v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). (The majority decided that no legal duty was owed
to someone not yet a person and legally considered only a fictitious being. Id. at 368, 56 N.E.
639). Subsequently, Allaire was overruled in Amann v. Faidy, 415 Il. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412
(1953).
61. Even though the court in Bonbrest limited recovery to viable fetuses, there is criticism
of this criterion. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E. 2d 1250 (1977)
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in health and medical technology is the catalyst for change:
As medical science progressed, the courts took notice that a fetus is
a separate human entity prior to birth. It is by now commonly
accepted that at conception the egg and sperm unite to jointly pro-
vide the genetic material requisite for human life. Thus, various
courts have gradually come to recognize that the embryo, from the
moment of conception, is a separate organism that can be compen-
sated for negligently inflicted prenatal harm.62
But any change that comes will concentrate on either the legislative or judi-
cial interpretation of "person" and consequences for protected structures or
doctrines such as parent-child, privacy, and the present posture of courts to
practice judicial restraint.
New Jersey is one state where judicial restraint has not forestalled its de-
sire to extend protection to the unborn. Even though the legislature had not
expressly included the unborn within the protection of its statutes,63 the ju-
(where the court allowed an action for preconception torts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869 (1977) (which rejects viability as a criterion for civil redress in prenatal torts: one
who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the harm if
the child is born alive); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101 R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966) (where the court
held that there was no precise moment of fetal development when the child attains the capabil-
ity of an independent existence, "and we reject viability as a decisive criterion.") Id. at 3250,
367 N.E.2d at 1252.
62. Annotation Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3D 1222, 1230 (1971). For cases
rejecting the viability or the entity theory, see, e.g., Kelly v. Gregory, 282 A.D. 542, 544-45,
125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953), (court held that the legal entity of the child began at the time of
biological separability of the fetus from the mother which coincides with conception, and that
a child born alive may recover for prenatal injury tortiously inflicted at any time at or after
conception regardless of whether the fetus is viable). Id. at 544-45, 125 N.Y.S.2d 697. But see
Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981), where
the court rejected an action for preconception torts. The court stated that recognition of such
a cause of action would require the extension of traditional tort concepts beyond manageable
bounds, and that foreseeability alone is not enough to assert a duty. Id. at 270, 429 N.E.2d. at
787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109. There are only three jurisdictions which recognize a cause of action
based on preconception torts. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); and Berg-
stresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978).
63. Today, the N.J. statute includes the unborn under its protection. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4C-11 (West 1981):
Whenever it appears that any child within this state is of such circumstances that his
welfare will be endangered unless proper care or custody is provided, an application
setting forth the facts in the case may be filed with the Bureau of Children's Services
by a parent or other relative of such child, by a person or association or agency or
public official having a special interest in such child or by the child himself, seeking
that the Bureau of Children's Services accept and provide such care or custody of
such child as the circumstances shall require. Such application shall be in writing
and shall contain a statement of the relationship to or special interest in such child
which justifies the filing of such application. The provisions of this section shall be
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diciary construed such statutes for the protection of the unborn.' Minne-
sota, on the other hand, is a state in which the legislature has expressly
included the unborn human within the definition of "person" for purposes of
protection,65 but that protection is for criminal offenses only and then too, if
the unborn is "born alive.",66 The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act does not
expressly include unborn persons. 67 Unless the legislature takes the initia-
tive prompted by the current concern over abuse of children and subsequent
fetal protection, even the prompting of the Soto court to use common law,
will likely not result in judicial implementation of protection. Still again,
medical technology may prompt judicial or legislative action. It has in New
York.
In the 1985 New York Matter of Smith6" case, the court was confronted
with a typical issue concerning abuse and the rights of the unborn. That is,
whether a finding that a child is neglected may be based solely on prenatal
deemed to include an application on behalf of an unborn child when the prospective
mother is within the state at the time of application for such services ....
64. Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1980). A nine-month pregnant
Jehovah's Witness female with RH negative blood was advised to obtain a blood transfusion to
save the life of her unborn child. Without the transfusion the child probably would die soon
after birth; if by chance it lived, the child would be physically or mentally deformed. The
judge held that the parents neglected their unborn child when they refused to consent to the
blood transfusion on religious grounds. In so conferring "personhood" upon the unborn
human, the court said that "nothing in any of the statutory provisions.. would preclude their
application to an unborn child." Id. at 519, 171 A.2d at 144.
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.21 (West 1964):
Subdivision 3: Resulting in death to an unborn child-whoever causes the death of an
unborn child as a result of operating a vehicle defined in § 169.01, subdivision 2, or an
aircraft or watercraft
(1) in a grossly negligent manner;
(2) in a negligent manner while under the influence of alcohol, a controlled
substance, or any combination of those elements; or
(3) in a negligent manner while having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or
more, is guilty of criminal vehicular operation in death to an unborn child and
may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 5 years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $10,000 or both. A prosecution for or conviction of a
crime under this subdivision is not a bar to conviction of or punishment for any
other crime, committed by the defendant as part of the same conduct.
Subdivision 4: Resulting in injury to unborn child-whoever causes great bodily harm
as defined in § 609.02, subdivision 8, to an unborn child who is subsequently born
alive, as a result of operating a vehicle as defined in § 169.01, subdivision 2, or an
aircraft or watercraft ...
66. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985). This case allows for the use of common
law rules of construction in the interpretation of penal statutes whenever there is an ambiguity,
thus allowing for judicial action. Id. at 627.
67. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (West 1982). Subdivision 2, defines a child as a person
under eighteen years of age.
68. 28 Misc.2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1985).
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conduct and whether the unborn child may be considered a person. These
are the concerns that surround parent-child immunity, privacy, and since
the New York statute did not provide expressly for the unborn, the issue of
judicial activism. 69 The central issue concerned the definition of person and
whether or not the judiciary would expand the definition to include the un-
born when those same unborn are the victims of abuse. The judiciary did
just that. Why? Again, medical science.
The Smith court noted that since medical science has advanced to such a
degree that fetal treatment is available, coupled with the mother's docu-
mented chronic alcohol abuse, there was adequate proof to sufficiently estab-
lish an "imminent danger" of impairment of physical condition, including
the possibility of fetal alcohol syndrome, thus constituting neglect within the
meaning of the statute.7° Thus, "personhood" was warranted for the unborn
human as a result of medical advances and even though the legislature had
not expressly provided for it. This was true, even when the unborn's status
was seen within the context of Roe v. 'Wade. "1 This 1973 decision did not
preclude the states from granting legal recognition to the unborn in non-
Fourteenth Amendment situations."2 The Smith case surely establishes-
and recognizes-a trend to afford protection and thus personhood to the
unborn even when there is no express legislative action. Partly this is due to
medical advances, partly to the impetus of the abuse furry.73
The judicial, legislative and societal debate over fetal rights has many ele-
ments in common with the legal predicament of clergy abuse and reporting
requirements. First, both are significantly affected by medical advances, the
viability of the fetus and medical prognosis of future problems associated
with child abuse are recent and now documented facts. Second, both con-
69. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1012(e) (McKinney 1987), which reads in pertinent part: "an
abused and/or neglected child is a person under eighteen years of age." Furthermore, the Act
defines a child as "any person or persons alleged to have been abused or neglected." Id. at
§ 1012(b).
70. 28 Misc.2d at 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (specifically enumerating the privacy rights of the mother over her
own body during pregnancy).
72. 28 Misc.2d at 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d 334.
73. For a very recent case, see In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (1986).
The court held that a heroin addicted mother who gave birth to a newborn suffering with-
drawal symptoms abused her child within the meaning of the state statute on child abuse. But
see Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977) (Cal. Court of
Appeals dismissed the case against a pregnant woman addicted to heroin who later gave birth
to twins addicted to heroin. The court relied upon legislative history to dismiss the criminal
complaint of felony child endangering). See also Justus v. Atchinson, 19 Cal. 3d at 578-79, 565
P.2d at 131, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 106 (1977). (Indicating that the California judiciary is not willing
to place a pregnant woman in the position of potential culpability for her prenatal conduct
without the express mandate of the legislature.)
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tain constitutional issues: the privacy rights of the mother and the free exer-
cise rights of the cleric are yet to be completely resolved. Third, the mother
that gives birth to the fetus and the cleric who confesses the child abuser,
enjoy a special status entitling each to immunities and privileges as ancient
as the common law. Fourth, as potential offender, the mother and the cleric
each is subject to criminal and civil penalties that are recent in inauguration
and piecemeal in application throughout the states. Each is subject to the
current popular argument of judicial restraint or legislative prerogative.
Fifth, at the center of fetal rights and the predicament of the clergy, is the
increased public awareness of child abuse and the need to protect children.
This last common element is perhaps the piston that shall drive the rest;
child abuse is so much a part of the public consciousness, the public is de-
manding accountability and the public is ready for new responses.
II. MEDICAL EVIDENCE
A. Medical Evidence Concerning the Children
The revision of the reporting statutes facilitating the identification and
prosecution of child sexual abusers is warranted and just. Child abuse is a
public offense and deserves to be condemned.74 But when the abuser, be that
person male or female, reaches a certain point, he or she may seek out a
place or a person for spiritual healing and reconciliation. This will not be
the choice of action of all abusers, but it is and has been the choice of some.
To whom does the abuser go for help? To whom would you go for help?
One clinical article describes a man whose sexual orientation can be de-
scribed as ego-dystonic, fixated, homosexual pedophilic. The man describes
his feelings as the following:
What starts a person like myself doing what I do? Why me? Why
can't I be normal like everybody else? You know, did God put this
74. No argument can be made that child abusers should be exempt from prosecution be-
cause he or she is a cleric. Clerics such as those previously described, see supra notes 3 & 4,
who abuse children are entitled to the same level of justice as any other offender. That is:
Persons who engage in dangerous or offensive sexual behaviors pose a variety of
medicolegal problems, especially if juveniles or nonconsenting adults are involved.
Some persons undoubtedly misuse other people with little concern for them and may
require quarantine or punishment. Others (just as true of some drug addicts, ciga-
rette smokers, or overeaters) may be in a sense victims of intense cravings that are
quite resilient and therefore difficult, if not impossible, to resist. Such persons must
still assume responsibility for their own actions, but when they seek medical help
they should be treated with an appreciation for their difficulties rather than with
stigmatization, scorn, or contempt.
Money, Ideas and Ethics of Psychosexual Determinism, 7 BRIT. J. SEXUAL MED., 27-32
(1979).
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as a punishment or something towards me? I am ashamed. Why
can't I just go out and have a good time with girls? I feel empty
when a female is present. An older gay' person would turn me off.
I have thought about suicide. I think after this long period of time,
I have actually seen where I have an illness. It is getting uncon-
trollable to the point where I can't put up with it anymore. It is a
sickness. I know it's a sickness. But as far as society is concerned,
you are a criminal and should be punished. Even if I go to jail for
twelve or fifteen years, or whatever, I am still going to be the same
when I get out.7 5
Sometimes a person such as this will go to a cleric, a person offering spiri-
tual assistance, because the abuser believes that the cleric will listen and can-
not tell society. No, the abuser is not seeking a cure, and it is only in the
most rare instances does the abuser expect a miracle. But the abuser expects
to talk, to have someone listen and no matter what the reaction from the
other side of the confessional screen, the abuser is now able to tell someone.
And then for the cleric there is an opportunity that must be grasped and a
reality that must be considered: here is a person who has abused one child
or many and at this moment there is a chance to change the pattern and
retrieve this person's life. This is reconciliation and it has secular and sacred
connotations.76
Reconciliation, allowed to have an opportunity because of the confidenti-
ality of the confessional and the sanctity of the priest-penitent privilege, al-
lows the abuser a link with society that may begin a program of treatment.
Indeed, this reconciliation is analogous to the immunity clauses added to the
reporting statutes by many state legislatures.77 As the immunity provision
75. Berlin & Krout, Pedophilia supra note 7, at 157-58. HADEN, READINGS ON CHILD
ABUSE, ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT (1986). (focusing on the need for treatment of the
pedophile so as to help perpetrators inhibit unwanted pedophilic inclinations).
76. This combination of secular and sacred purpose is what separates the priest-penitent
privilege from the doctor-patient privilege. Courts have been more willing to abrogate the
doctor-patient privilege because, "the right of privacy was not absolute, and in some circum-
stances subordinate to the states' fundamental right to enact laws that promote public health,
welfare, and safety, even though such laws might invade the offender's right of privacy." Peo-
ple v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 816, 202 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1984). See also In re Brenda H.,
119 N.H. 382, 402 A.2d 169 (1979) (superseded by statute in Case v. Case, 121 N.H. 647, 433
A.2d 1257 (1981); People v. Battaglia, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1016, 203 Cal. Rptr 330 (1984).
Thus, clerics, attorneys, and physicians face the same issue with regard to the abrogation of
any privilege that would safeguard communications with a client. But because of specific con-
stitutional guarantees (free exercise or due process), the cleric and the attorney are likely to
sustain the privilege. See, e.g., Comment, Duties in Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report
Child Abuse Inflicted by Clients and Confided in Therapy?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 (1985).
77. See Saltzman, Protection for the Child or the Parent? The Conflict Between the Federal
Drug and Alcohol Abuse Confidentiality Requirements and the State Child Abuse and Neglect
Reporting Laws, S.I.U.L.J. 181 (1985).
1988]
110 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 4:91
is designed to facilitate reporting and lessen future abuse, so can we posit
that the priest-penitent privilege allows confidentiality-immunity so as to
lessen future abuse.
The difficulty with the analogy is that it is easier to prove the existence of
immunity generated reports, but impossible to prove the efficacy of peniten-
tial privilege. Nonetheless, the value of the penitential privilege must rest
upon the sincere secular and sacred objectives. Only when these objec-
tives-penance, avoidance of the offense, participation in effective treatment,
a sincere desire not to commit the offense again-are fostered and enforced,
is there an effective answer to those who would abolish the privilege in light
of the vast increase in child abuse. An emphasis upon these objectives,
rather than upon the constitutional basis in free exercise, is a better approach
to the state's actual or potential abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege; it
responds to the public interest in lessening child abuse. Legislators should
be convinced of the efficacy of the privilege, rather than forced into accept-
ance through constitutional law.7 8
The priest-penitent privilege has no public-secular purpose if the
pedophile abuser cannot sustain treatment and be returned to society so as to
make a contribution. Today, physicians such as Dr. Fred Berlin, think that
treatment is possible. Thus, "[T]o the extent that treatment helps the
pedophile gain better self control, both his interests and society's interests
are served."79 Since the privilege will assist in inviting treatment, all inter-
ests are served.
If the condition of pedophilia is irreversible, cannot be modified or con-
trolled, then the argument can be made at a public-secular level that the
pedophile should be identified through as broad a reporting net as possible,
and then taken from the streets consistent with due process and incarcer-
ated. Even while maintaining the strict spiritual and reconciling nature of
sacramental confession no matter how abject the sinner, many clerics would
be in agreement with the public purpose of protecting child and society and
78. Society's interest in the priest-penitent privilege is at least equal to, if not greater than,
the attorney-client privilege. Each has a basis in constitutional law (see, e.g., In re Agosto, 553
F. Supp. 1298, 1306-07 (D. Nev. 1983) emphasizing the client's due process rights), and each
has a public purpose of seeking to promote privacy so as to bring about a fair trial for the
attorney's client and a free exercise of religion for the priest's penitent. Nonetheless, some
states have retained the attorney-client privilege and abrogated that of the priest penitent. see,
e.g. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986) ".... except in the case of communications
between attorney and client." See also In re Brenda, 402 A.2d at 171 (stating the reporting
statute did abrogate all privileges except the one for attorney-client). One state has abrogated
all privileges. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 432b.010 (1986) (requiring reports from every attorney
who suspects child abuse and abrogates all other privileges).
79. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 169.
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suffer deep moral anguish over reporting penitent offenders.8° But again, if
medical technology does provide some form of treatment, then the
mandatory incarceration argument lacks validity and the value of the privi-
lege retains its secular and its sacred objectives.
Thus, does medical technology offer any guidance to the legislature con-
sidering the abrogation of the priest-penitent privilege? Is there treatment
available which would support the necessity of the privilege as an induce-
ment to child abusers to make a voluntary "confession" and halt any future
abuse? The answer is yes, there is treatment, in sufficient amount to justify
the privilege, but at present, there is no cure.8 ' The emphasis of medical
technology is upon "the educative and re-training aspects of therapy which
involve the learning of new, wanted behaviours rather than the 'cure of an
illness' .2 Thus, reports of a cure should be read with suspicions3 and ef-
80. It must be borne in mind that the persons to whom privilege is given must often want
to report and break the privilege, thereby facing censure, but at the same time protecting
children. Forcing the priest, attorney or physician to report does not take away the dilemma
she or he faces.
"If the priest is among the group of those required or permitted to report and testify
in cases of suspected child abuse, and if his suspicions of child abuse arise from a
confidential communication, then he is faced with a legal and ethical dilemma of
whether to report or to keep his confidence."
Note, When Must a Priest Report Under a Child Abuse Reporting Statute?-Resolution to the
Priests' Conflicting Duties, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 433 (1987). It is arguable that a deciding ele-
ment in the legal and ethical decision will be the level of treatment available to the penitent/
client/patient.
81. Even the medical treatment of castration of the male pedophile, either by surgery or
injection of cyproterone acetate, is not an absolute cure. In one study in Denmark, there was a
30 year investigation of 900 castrated "sex offenders," many of whom were pedophiles. There
were over 4,000 follow-up examinations and still there was a 3% recidivism rate. Studies done
in Sweden, Holland (237 men with a 1.3% recidivism rate), and Switzerland (there was a 5.8%
recidivism rate among 120 men following castration, with a 52% recidivism rate in the non-
castrated control group) report comparable findings. Thus, even though the surgical and phar-
macological methods of lowering testosterone seemed to be very effective, then was not positive
cures for all. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 165-66.
82. B. Taylor, Perspectives on Pedophilia, 84-85 (1981). Treatment has four principal
objectives:
(1) The establishment of rewarding adult sexual relationships (heterosexual or
homosexual);
(2) The improvement of sexual function within an existing adult sexual relationship
(heterosexual or homosexual);
(3) Increase in self-control over sexual behavior; and
(4) Adjustment to the pedophiliac role. Id. at 85. The fourth objective certainly is
an approach which has many moral and ethical considerations, as the authors sug-
gest: "A last consideration might be to recommend those whose motivation for
change is minimal to move to an environment, e.g. parts of Morocco or Turkey,
where legal and social constraints against non-coercive pedophilic practices are less
extreme than in our own society. Id. at 91.
83. A recent headline in the Arizona Republic reads, "'Cured' Molester Admits 57 New
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forts to provide therapy monitored for effectiveness. To date, proposed ther-
apy treatments include psychotherapy, behavior therapy, surgery, and
medications such as Medroxyprogesterone acetate (Depo-Provera), which
reduces testosterone.
8 4
Even while admitting that medical therapy is available and does in fact
make a difference, those persons responsible for the more advanced research
in the United States admit: "To our knowledge there have been no well-
controlled clinical trials to demonstrate that any of the individual or group
psychodynamic methods result in sustained behavioral change in these con-
ditions (sexually deviant behaviors), and achieving into how they may have
developed does not necessarily alter them. In point of fact, most of us have
little understanding about why particular things arouse us sexually." a Cer-
tainly the pedophile is difficult to classify.86
A review of the clerics described at the beginning of this Article would
decry any stereotype of a pedophile as a dirty, dangerous "old man" who
attacks innocent young children in isolated spots, rapes them and then leaves
the child in a permanent state of shock and damage. This is not the case and
this is why so many instances of child abuse go unreported and the abuser
untreated.
A more accurate description of a pedophile would contain elements of the
following: First, the average age of a child molester is 35 years-old. 87 This
would comport with the definition of researchers who define pedophilia as
persons who are adults and simply find children to be appealing; there is no
age designation. Also, "This condition for unknown reasons seems to occur
Counts." This 42 year-old pedophile appeared on "60 Minutes" in 1978 to describe his cure of
pedophilia. "During his trial in 1983 he was charged with 5 new counts of lewd and lascivious
behavior with over a dozen boys." A. MAYER, SEXUAL ABUSE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES
AND TREATMENT OF INCESTUOUS & PEDOPHILIC ACTS 23 (1985).
84. As this Article pertains to clerics, it should be noted that certain religious denomina-
tions would prohibit some or all of the different methods of treatment. Thus, the Roman
Catholic Church would forbid castration and the fostering of alternate adult sexual relation-
ships when the cleric is under a vow of celibacy. Even the taking of medications would be
forbidden to some clerics.
85. Sexual Behavior and the Sex Hormones, LANCET 2:17-18, (1979); Gadpaille, WJ,
Cross-species and Cross-cultural contributions to Understanding Homosexual Activity, 37
ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 349, 349-356 (1980); Berlin & Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offend-
ers with Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Modalities, and
Preliminary Findings, 601 AM. PSYCHIATRY A. 600 (1981) [hereinafter Berlin & Meincke].
86. See, e.g., Berlin, supra note 6, at 86-87.
87. Plummer, Pedophilia: Constructing A Sociological Baseline, in ADULT SEXUAL IN-
TEREST IN CHILDREN, PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOPATHY 221 (1981). In a group called the
Pedophile Information Exchange, 25 of their members were in the 20-29 age range, 28 were in
the 30-39 range, 20 in the 40-49 range, 11 ranged from 50-59, seven in the 60 to 69 age range
and one was over 69. Id.
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almost exclusively in men.",8 8  Based on studies at the Sexual Behavior
Clinic of the New York State Psychiatric Institute at Columbia-Presbyterian
Medical Center in Manhattan, the victims of these pedophiles were defined
as, "boys or girls age 13 or younger, with at least five years difference in age
between the victim and the molester.",89  This demonstrates that the abuser
is certainly younger than the stereotypical image.
Second, while most people would think that the pedophile is a stranger,
studies show he is not. "The largest group of victimizers are caretakers-
parents, baby sitters and those to whom we entrust children."'  One of the
most respected studies concerned females who had been approached sexually
when they were less than 14 years-old by a male who was at least five years
older than themselves. Almost half the males involved were relatives or ac-
quaintances, 9' and the sexual activity (which is often mutual fondling and
masturbation rather than intercourse) frequently occurs in the home of
either the victim or the pedophile. 92
A third stereotype is that the sex itself is forced on the child and is uncon-
88. Berlin & Krout, supra note 7, at 2. See Berlin, supra note 6. "In terms of reported
cases, pedophilia appears to be almost exclusively a male problem, although its exact preva-
lence is unknown. The majority of cases in the literature have involved heterosexual
pedophilia (men attracted towards little girls), but more recently some centers have reported a
higher frequency of homosexual involvements." Berlin, supra note 6, at 87. In reference to
British crime statistics, one British article notes:
In 1976, only 40 women were found guilty of any sexual offenses (other than prosti-
tution), and 10 of these were indecent assaults on females. Note, it is not technically
even an offense for a woman to have sexual intercourse with a boy over 14-an indi-
cation of a bias within the criminal categories by which most crime is male-defined.
Plummer, supra note 87, at 245 n. 5. Professor Plummer also suggest a cultural bias that
would make the male a pedophile and the woman maternal, nurturant and affectionate. He
writes: "I suspect there is a considerable degree of adult female-child sexuality. Most of this,
however, is hidden because of the expectations of the female role which simultaneously expect
a degree of bodily contact between woman and child and deny the existence of sexuality in
women." Id. at 228. Those who have seen the movie, "The Summer of '42" must wonder why
the older woman was not immediately classified as a pedophile.
89. Collins, Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y. Times, May 13,
1982, at Cl, col.l.
90. Id. "Approximately one-third of all reported cases of child molestation are commit-
ted by strangers .... Another third of the cases involve acquaintances known to the child (a
neighbor, friend of the family, or community leader) and one-third of the molestations are
committed by primary relatives." Id. Distinctions should always be made between persons
who engage in incestuous acts and those who are pedophiles. If the primary sexual orientation
is towards children in general and not just towards his own offspring, the term pedophilia
applies.
91. D.J. West, Adult Sexual Interest in Children: Implications For Social Control, in SEX-
UAL INTEREST IN CHILDREN, PERSONALITY AND PSYCHOPATHY 252 (1981); [hereinafter
West, Adult Sexual Interest in Children]. See generally A.C. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953).
92. Berlin, supra note 86, at 87.
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trolled. This is not true. "Pedophilia occurs in part with the cooperation of
the child either out of sexual curiosity or out of emotional need. It is com-
paratively rare that the sex act is forced on the child." 9a  While this may
seem to isolate the child from violence, the emotional trauma of the present
and future is serious. For instance, at some point the child will "grow up"
and the attention the child had received from the pedophile now diminishes
as the erotic component dwindles. "This can, of course, bring acute
problems to the child who may be startled or confused about this sudden
change of erotic interest by the adult."94 The future can bring additional
problems, as researchers continually report, "certain types of early child-
hood experiences seem to play a contributory factor in determining adult
sexual interests. Many pedophiles, for example, were themselves sexually
involved with adults as youngsters. '" A future consisting of continuing
pedophilia should be considered a form of violence.
The fourth stereotype is similar in tone to the previous one and also con-
ceals harm to the child. The stereotype is that the sex act itself is damaging
and dangerous and may even lead to such things as child murder. As has
been discussed earlier, violence is extremely rare between a pedophile and a
child.96 Since pedophiles are more likely to "seduce children with loving
attention, physical affection, verbal praise and a wide variety of other re-
93. Plummer, supra note 87, at 225. A distinction must be made between child rape and
pedophilia. The former consists of incidents such as the killings in Atlanta, Georgia, during
1980 and 1981, or the brutal rape and murder of a two-and-one-half year old girl by a sadistic
molester of children (called mysoped). The girl's grandmother eventually began a program
called S.L.A.M. (Society's League Against Molesters). Perhaps such brutality is becoming
more common, as written in the N.Y. Times: "[a] recent study of police and emergency-room
records of child molestation by Dr. William Marshall and his colleagues at Queens University
in Kingston, Ontario, reported that 40% of the cases of sexual abuse of children involved force
or violent acts." Collins, supra note 89 at Cl, col. 1. In the United States, the National Center
for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect reports an increase in the sexual
mistreatment of children. Id. Yet, a study in Detroit, Michigan, of over 1,252 sex offenses
against children found that physical injury occurred in less than nine percent of the cases.
Berlin, supra note 86, at 87.
94. Plummer, supra note 87, at 236. Surely not all pedophiles would reject or abandon a
relationship with a child upon maturation but, just as in any other relationship, the ardor may
wane and the child will be less able to deal with it than an adult.
95. Berlin, supra note 86, at 88; D. Crawford, Treatment Approaches with Pedophiles 22
PERSONALITY & PSYCHOPATHY 209 (1981) (author quotes others as suggesting that adoles-
cent problems of heterosexual adjustment may facilitate the development of pedophiliac inter-
ests); Berlin & Meineke, supra note 85, at 606. (Data presented in the report suggest that
non-learned biological as well as learned environmental factors may play an etiological role in
the development of sexually deviant behaviors); BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7 at 159.
("Many men who experience pedophilic erotic urges as adults were sexually involved with
adults when they were children").
96. See supra note 91.
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wards,"97 instances of rape or sexual violence are rare. But again, even
though there are few instances, there are some and if the researchers are
correct, pedophiles tend to produce others and so on. Thus, the potential for
a form of violence is there.
But an important point must be made. Because a person is a pedophile
does not mean that this same person, "is lacking in conscience, diminished in
intellectual capabilities, or somehow 'characterologically flawed.' "" The
pedophile will have character, intellect, temperament, and other mental ca-
pacities, and it is incorrect to assume that because a person is a pedophile he
will be violent, or homosexual, or any other stereotype. 99
Those who think that the child is uninvolved in fthe activity are guilty of
the fifth stereotype associated with pedophilia. Even though the child does
not precipitate the act in the same sexual way associated with adult sexual-
ity, children do engage in affection-seeking behavior and thus it is wrong to
suggest that the child is totally passive.l" ° It is plausible to estimate that
many children who find themselves in institution care, or under the supervi-
sion of repeated "strangers" will act in ways which can establish relation-
ships with adults.'00 If children cannot achieve a sufficient level of emotional
response from one parent, the child may resort to activities which will facili-
tate pedophilia. Thus, the changing American family can well be a reason
why there is an increase in child abuse;'0 2 placed in a stress-filled home envi-
97. ADELEMAYER, SEXUAL ABUSE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND TREATMENT OF IN-
CESTUOUS & PEDOPHILC ACTS 20 (1985).
98. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 161.
99. Id. "Men with unconventional sexual orientations such as pedophilia can manifest a
range of character traits, just as is true of persons with conventional heterosexual orienta-
tions." Berlin, supra note 86, at 90. Thus, a pedophile who has been consistently non-violent
in temperament would not ordinarily be expected to undergo a sudden change in personality so
as to become a physical danger to others. Id.
100. Plummer, supra note 87, at 226. While each child will differ in needs and tempera-
ment, it is the general consensus that, since "sexual activity by pedophiles with children rarely
involves physical assaultiveness and is usually the result of persuasion rather than coercion,"
the child must be responding in some way. Berlin, supra note 6, at 87.
101. Plummer, supra note 87, at 226. The change in the American family has produced
many children who now will grow up in a one-parent household. While such an arrangement
does not automatically mean that a child will suffer emotional deprivation, it does suggest that
it will be more difficult for a child to develop sustained relationships that can provide the level
of emotional response needed.
102. One indication of the changing nature of American family structure is found in
KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN 14-15 (1988). Writing about the growing homeless
population in New York City, the author writes:
New York is spending, in 1987, $247 Million to provide emergency shelter to its
homeless population. Of this sum, about $150 million is assigned to homeless fami-
lies with children. Nonetheless, the growth in numbers of the dispossessed far out-
paces city allocations. Nine hundred families were given shelter in New York on any
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ronment, children will seek emotional response. Furthermore, many of these
children will grow up in households that are poor, an additional burden.
If modem trends continue, not only poverty will increase in American
children, but child abuse predicated upon unmet needs of the children them-
selves. It has been estimated that sixty percent of the children born in 1984
will live in a one-parent family before they are eighteen. Females will head
ninety percent of these one-parent households. For the same year, 7.3 mil-
lion families were classified as poor, 3.8 million of these were single-par-
ent. 10 3 The catastrophic assessments of persons such as Senator Daniel
Patrick Moynihan contribute to more than the decline of the American fam-
ily. They predict the rise of incidents of child abuse as children become
financially and emotionally destitute. Children will become less passive, in-
viting more abuse.
The sixth stereotype concerning pedophilia suggests that the consequences
to the child are devastating. This may be the case with non-consensual ac-
tivity. The most common response was one of simple fright."°  In one
British study quoted by Dr. Kenneth Plummer, it was reported:
By far the greatest potential damage to the child's personality is
caused by society and the victim's parents, as the result of (1) the
need to use the victim to prosecute the offender, and (2) the need of
parents to prove to themselves, family, neighborhood and society
that the victim was free of voluntary participation and that they
were not failures as parents. 10 5
Other researchers suggest more lasting consequences. Dr. West, in another
British report, writes:
Children can be pressed into continued erotic practices that they
do not really want because they fear to displease, or to be rejected,
or because they cannot bring themselves to give up the rewards of
compliance. They may come to feel guilty, perhaps because of the
sordid or secretive circumstances of the affair, or from fear of the
consequences of detection. This may in turn interfere with the de-
velopment of relationships with peers."
And in studies done in the United States, "many men who experienced
given night in 1978; 2,900 by 1984; 4,000 by the end of 1985; 5,000 by the spring of
1987. The city believes the number will exceed 6,000 by the summer of 1988 .... By
1990, the actual homeless, added to the swelling numbers of the hidden homeless,
will exceed 400,000 in New York.
103. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 48 (1986).
104. Plummer, supra note 87, at 226-27.
105. Id.
106. West, supra note 91, at 255. In essence, Dr. West agrees with the other studies done
in Great Britain.
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pedophilic erotic urges as adults were sexually involved with adults when
they were children."' 7 Any orientation to pedophilia cannot be taken
lightly. As Dr. Berlin writes: "Living in a world where all those who are
sexually appealing are forbidden as partners must be difficult-a situation
heterosexual adults can, perhaps, empathize with by imagining living in a
world where one was expected to have sex only with children."'08
Thus, there are consequences to the child, although immediate violence or
trauma is rare. More likely would be feelings of fright, guilt, loss of peer
development and a definite possibility of eventual development of pedophilic
tendencies. But those who suggest that an early homosexual relationship
between child and adult will dispose that child to an adult homosexual ori-
entation, have little evidence to support that claim." "In most cases, fac-
tors present long before the pedophiliac incidents seem to be the main
determinants of receptiveness or resistance to heterosexual inducements."" o
B. Medical Evidence Concerning the Pedophile
"People do not decide voluntarily what will arouse them sexually.
Rather, they discover within themselves what sorts of persons and activities
are appealing to them."' When we defined a pedophile, we said he (or she)
experiences absolutely no erotic attraction whatsoever towards adults, but
has a great deal of difficulty resisting the sexual temptations that he (or she)
experiences towards children." 2 He is not a person with a raincoat and over
the age of seventy, rather, he is probably a mature unmarried male over the
age of eighteen who relates well to children and was sexually involved him-
self with an adult when he was a child. But remember: "Despite the high
risk profile, . . . pedophiles can be of any age, married or single, bisexual,
homosexual, or heterosexual. They work in such varied occupations as la-
borer, social worker, physician, computer sales manager, bank official-any
107. Berlin & Krout, supra note 7, at 159. See Berlin, supra note 6, at 88: "many
pedophiles ... were themselves sexually involved with adults as youngsters."
108. Berlin supra note 6, at 89.
109. Plummer, supra note 87, at 227.
110. West, supra note 91, at 256.
111. Berlin, supra note 6, at 89.
112. This person would be defined as a fixated pedophile. A. Nicholas Groth, leading au-
thor of MEN WHO RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER, believes there are two cate-
gories of pedophiles: fixated and regressed. "The regressed pedophile tends to revert to an
early mode of (fantasized) behavior, satisfaction and/or gratification when he is under stress.
Because his behavior is neither habitual nor compulsive, he tends to be more amenable to
therapeutic interventions." MAYER, SEXUAL ABUSE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND TREAT-
MENT OF INCESTUOUS & PEDOPHILIC AcTs, at 23 (1985). Persons who form a very small
minority of pedophiles and are characterized by sadism or murder, are distinct yet often at-
tracted to children. This behavior is referred to as mysopedic. Id. at 24.
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job that can be named."
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How does it happen? Is there a choice involved? There is definite evi-
dence that those who are pedophiles have at some time been victims; and one
researcher has proposed that, "excessive prohibition of early sexual expres-
sion may also put one at risk of developing pedophilic sexual desires."' 4
Other studies suggest that pedophilia does in fact occur more frequently in
some families than others. Then too, biology may have an influence:
"Although it appears that specific sexual tastes or preferences may some-
times be modified by virtue of early life experiences, the phenomenon of sex-
ual desires itself is apparently unlearned and rooted in biology.""' Thus,
summarizing possible causes, it is useful to note that at the Johns Hopkins
Hospital Sexual Disorders Clinic, it is unusual to see a man who experiences
recurrent pedophilic cravings in the absence of one of the following: (1) a
significant biological abnormality, (2) a past history of sexual involvement
with an adult during childhood, or (3) both.'
16
Once the general nature of the pedophile has been identified, the possibil-
ity of treatment can be suggested. But since the cause or the exact "etiology
of erotic desires and fantasies that influence conventional heterosexual be-
havior, as well as knowledge about what makes a stimulus sexually appeal-
ing, is also poorly understood,"' 1 7 treatment of deviant sexual desires is
really a modification of the character traits of the individual experiencing
them. Treatment is directed more towards what the pedophile does than
what makes him or her do it exactly. The treatment, whatever form it should
take, has never been demonstrated to be 100 percent effective as a "cure."
This is true, even when the male pedophile has been castrated, although this
harsh treatment reports a very low rate of recidivism. At the other extreme
is punishment such as incarceration in prison. "The recidivism rate is ex-
tremely high when punishment is the treatment of choice, as punishment
113. MAYER, supra note 112, at 25.
114. Berlin & Krout, supra note 7, at 159.
115. Id. at 160:
"Following statistical analysis, Berlin (1983) concluded, as have others, that there
may, indeed, be an association between the presence of certain kinds of biological
abnormalities and the presence of unconventional kinds of sexual interests such as
pedophilia." Id. See Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 85, at 606: "At a symposium at
the Mass. Inst. of Technology, Goy and McEwen reviewed evidence suggesting that
nonlearned biological factors may be more important determinants of human sexual
behavior than is generally appreciated. Improved understanding of possible genetic,
hormonal, or neurochemical bases for human sexual pathology should be sought in
pursuing further the rationale for treatment with medication."
SEXUAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE BRAIN (Goy, McEwen ed. 1977).
116. Id. at 160-61.
117. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 85, at 601.
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does virtually nothing to make it any easier for a man to resist deviant sex-
ual cravings." '
Treatment of the pedophile is important to the legal discussion regarding
the reporting statutes because there is implicit in both the secular as well as
the sacred purposes of the priest-penitent privilege the necessity for change,
reconciliation, a cessation of pedophile conduct. While some of the medical
treatments will be rejected for theological reasons by persons entitled to use
the privilege, others parallel the secular and spiritual purposes of reconcilia-
tion. Thus, if the priest-minister-rabbi-spiritual director is to utilize a secu-
lar purpose underlining a privilege from reporting known or suspected child
abuse reported in confession, that person claiming the privilege should be
schooled in the modem medical approaches to therapy and treatment. This
responsibility must be accepted by the religious denominations.
Dr. Fred S. Berlin, reports that there are four major modalities for treat-
ing pedophilia: (1) psychotherapy, (2) behavior therapy, (3) surgery, and
(4) medication. 1 9 No matter the mode, treatment is necessary and impor-
tant to society and the religious perspectives asserting the priest-penitent
privilege. In an effort to maintain a personal dignity suggested by authors
and researchers such as Dr. Berlin,12 the privilege can be an opportunity for
change and cessation of criminal conduct. Again, this is beneficial to society
as a whole as, "treatment undertaken on the individual's own voluntary ini-
tiative is easier and better than treatment forced later on as a result of some
social crisis." 12 ' Amazingly, one British researcher suggests advertising
confidential "walk-in" counselling services as a means through which this
118. Berlin, supra note 6, at 92. See, West, supra note 91, at 262: "[T]he criminal justice
system... [has] little relevance to the psychological situations underlying pedophiliac behav-
ior." Id.
119. Berlin & Krout, supra note 7, at 163. Within each of these modalities are individual
variations and suggestions for newer and more modem treatments. For a detailed description
of modem treatment approaches, contact should be made with the Sexual Disorders Clinic,
Meyer 101, The Johns Hopkins Hospital, 600 North Wolfe Street, Baltimore, Md. 21205.
120. Dr. Berlin likes to combine the religious values of the Bible with the need for secular
treatment within society. He writes:
Almost two thousand years ago as an outraged crowd attempted to stone to death a
woman whose sexual behavior they considered offensive, one man stepped forward to
stop the retribution, speaking against such revenge while espousing values such as
compassion, understanding, forgiveness, and reformation. He asked that persons be
judged not simply by their behavior but with some appreciation for their humanity.
Perhaps that message still goes unheeded today when it comes to the issue of how we
deal with some of those who have sexual and affectional orientations of a sort that
frighten us, and that differ from our own.
BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 11-12.
121. West, supra note 91, at 263.
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treatment may begin.12 2 The priest-penitent privilege provides this today;
the rationale suggests extending the privilege to physicians working in a psy-
chotherapy role.' 23
In regards to treatment, all researches would agree that "[m]en with
pedophiliac and related sexual problems who want to change their habits
need treatment centres where all relevant techniques can be applied, from
social skills training to psychoanalysis, from orgasmic reconditioning to hor-
monal medication." 124 Some researchers would say that the best time to
start treatment is in youth or early adulthood, when failure to develop sexual
relationships with persons of a suitable age first becomes a noticeable prob-
lem. 12 5 The purpose of all treatment is to help "a person stop rationalizing,
as well as helping him to develop strategies for more successfully resisting
sexual and affectional temptations."
126
If, as a result of privileged communications, the cleric is able to recom-
mend treatment to the penitent pedophile, what are the particulars of each of
the modalities listed by Dr. Berlin?
127
122. Id. This point emphasizes the present day insistence on "prevention rather than
cure." Researchers suggest that adolescent problems of heterosexual adjustment may facilitate
the development of pedophiliac interests and that more resources such as sex education and
anonymous counseling could contribute to prevention. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, PERSONALITY
AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, 181-211 (1981).
123. Even though physicians were among the first to lose any privilege associated with the
reporting statutes, those physicians servings in a capacity as psychotherapists face a similar
dilemma as priests when they are directed to report confidential communications. See Com-
ment, Duties in Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report Child Abuse Inflicted by Clients and
Confided in Therapy? 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 0985).
124. West, supra note 91, at 263.
125. While specific treatment for pedophilia may include the development of alternate (and
legal) sexual partners, this is one of the treatments which many religious denominations will
find offensive. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that easier access to adult sex or a more
developed adult sexual identity would be a preventive measure and a form of treatment. West,
supra note 91, at 264. See, MARKS, REVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOTHERAPY, II: SEXUAL
DISORDERS, 138 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 750-56 (1981), for a study of sexual dysfunction and a
behavior approach to developing more socially acceptable sexual conduct. Obviously, such
treatment would not be suitable for celibate clergy.
126. Berlin & Krout, supra note 7, at 168.
127. It is important to note that no suggestion is made that the cleric assume the role of
counselor to the pedophile. The protection of the privilege for the cleric lies in the fact that the
cleric serves in a spiritual capacity with entry-level benefits for society and reconciling effects
for the spiritual welfare of the pedophile. Elements of civil negligence and also criminal re-
porting mandates will penalize the cleric who assumes the role of a professional therapist or
the singular role of psychotherapist. See Flemming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim:
The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025 0974); Note, Tort Law--The Psychiatric Duty
to Warn; Cairl v. State, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 513 (1983); Note, Psychotherapists and the Duty to
Warn: An Attempt at Clarification, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 597 (1984). See also for negligence
on the part of clergy and civil consequences, Nally v. Grace Community Church, 157 Cal.
App.3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (religious counseling: parents allowed to pursue suit
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(1) Psychotherapy
Since medical science still does not know exactly what controls the sexual
orientation of a person, it is difficult to modify behavior that society would
regard as undesirable. Nonetheless, when a pedophile is placed in a psycho-
therapy program of treatment, he is involved in a program that utilizes the
process of introspection to try to identify what went wrong with the expecta-
tion that newly acquired insights will then facilitate the problem being recti-
fied. This is a process that has ancient roots; it is probably the first form of
treatment encountered by pedophiles prior to the establishment of today's
modem treatment centers.
Today, "the most widely used treatment for pedophiles is probably group
psychotherapy." 1 28 But "it is doubtful that individuals can come to under-
stand the basis of their own sexual interests through the process of introspec-
tion alone." 129 Researchers are concerned over the expense and lengthy
process of psychotherapy and conclude that," psychoanalysis and individual
psychotherapy used alone appear to be of little value in the treatment of
pedophiles, and group therapy has still to demonstrate clearly its
effectiveness." 
1 30
Treatment within the context of the traditional definition of psychother-
apy does not offer a panacea for pedophiles or society. Indeed, even when
used in a comprehensive form of treatment, utilizing the other modalities
identified by Dr. Berlin, there is no cure for pedophilia. The value of psy-
chotherapy lies in its history and its use with other modes of response.
(2) Behavior Therapy
Unlike psychotherapy which was concerned with identifying the historical
antecedents of pedophilia within persons, behavior therapy attempts to ex-
tinguish erotic feelings associated with children, while simultaneously teach-
ing an individual to become sexually aroused by formerly non-arousing age-
appropriate partners. Needless to say, this form of therapy will have conse-
quences within the context of clergy, be the cleric the offender or the referral
against church and clergy for son's suicide); Comment, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitu-'
tional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507 (1983).
128. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 190. None of the researchers are comfortable with
psychotherapy alone as a form of treatment. Rather, each would favor a "comprehensive"
program of treatment from which the therapist can utilize many forms of treatment to modify
the behavior of the patient. Medical progress is being made each day, controlled clinical stud-
ies are being evaluated, and the effects of long term treatment are being studied.
129. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 163.
130. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 190. Psychotherapy is used in the context of compre-
hensive treatment and the results there are better appreciated by researchers. Id. at 191.
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agent within the spiritual confines of confession. Since most religious de-
nominations have specific creeds or revelatory documents forbidding sexual
relations outside marriage, and some denominations mandate a celibate
clergy, any type of behavior that seeks to "stimulate" sexual activity will
affect the clerical predicament. In addition, as behavior modification can
include chemical or electrical stimulation, religious denominations may find
themselves recommending medical practices forbidden on ethical or reli-
gious principles. Eventually, for the religious superior as well as the priest in
the priest-penitent context, the choice may seem as the lesser of two evils or,
does the end justify any means?
There is not a great deal of information from controlled studies regarding
behavior modification and pedophilia per se. Most work has been directed
towards homosexuality. Nonetheless, the basic objectives will be, as de-
scribed by a British report,"' the following:
(1) The establishment of rewarding adult sexual relationships
(heterosexual or homosexual);
(2) The improvement of sexual function within an existing adult
sexual relationship (heterosexual or homosexual);
(3) Increase in self-control over sexual behavior; and
(4) Adjustment to the pedophilic role.
While obtaining these objectives, the emphasis is upon the educative and re-
training aspects of therapy which involve the learning of new, wanted behav-
iors, rather than the "cure" of an illness. Note that there is no emphasis
upon punishment, as this is found to be the least effective treatment for
pedophilia. 132
There are specific behavior approaches. The earliest is aversion therapy
with its utilization of drug induced nausea or electrical shock, now used
almost exclusively. While such methods have advantages over both castra-
tion and more lasting drug treatments, it has ethical difficulties for some
131. PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA 85 (B. Taylor ed. 1981) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES
ON PAEDOPHILIA].
132. Incarceration takes the pedophile out of society but this does nothing to change the
nature of the sexual orientation or increase the pedophile's ability to resist the compulsion.
Even though control and removal of the pedophile is important, researchers emphasize treat-
ment. See BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 164. See also West, supra note 91, at 262.
But the criminal justice system is a crude, sometimes inhumane and often ineffectual
instrument. It can only deal with the probably untypical minority brought to its
attention, its methods are essentially repressive rather than remedial and its decisions
are governed by a tariff of punishments that have little relevance to the psychological
situations underlying pedophiliac behavior.
See also Berlin, supra note 6, at 92: "The recidivism rate is extremely high when punishment is
the treatment" of choice, as punishment does virtually nothing to make it any easier for a man
to resist deviant sexual cravings."
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therapists, does nothing to identify the causes of pedophilia and there are no
studies that demonstrate long term improvement of the pedophile. In es-
sence, this is a negative form of behavior modification.
A more positive form of therapy is assertiveness training. This training
relates to the finding that "[A] proportion of pedophiliac acts represent sub-
stitute gratifications sought by men frustrated in their desire for an adult
partner."' 33 Studies done say that training the pedophile to become more
assertive enables him to cope with adult relationships and thus eliminates the
need to seek out children. 134 It is difficult to imagine this type of treatment
as offensive to most of the religious denominations, yet there will be diffi-
culty in establishing alternative sexual gratification if the offending pedophile
is a cleric and the religious denomination mandates celibacy.
Clerical pedophiles who are operative in a celibate denomination and wish
to remain there will have difficulty with many of the more modem
behavioural approaches. Also, inasmuch as some of the newer approaches
emphasize alternate non-deviant sexual arousal, if it occurs uutside of mar-
riage, many more religious denominations will have difficulties with offend-
ing clerics and recommending such techniques to penitents. Difficult choices
will arise in the context of the priest-penitent privilege and its secular and
ecclesiastical purposes of change and reconciliation.
Some of the alternate non-deviant sexual arousal techniques now being
tested as part of a comprehensive program of treatment would include:
(1) fantasy modification, (2) exposure to explicit stimuli, (3) classical condi-
tioning, (4) shaping and fading operant conditioning, (5) biofeedback and
(6) systematic desensitization of anxiety. These all emphasize the increase
of sexual arousal; the decrease of sexual arousal has been attempted through
covert sensitization, biofeedback and masturbatory satiation. These latter
techniques may be a bit more acceptable within the context of clergy and
religious doctrine.' 35 And since these activities have the effect of enticing
the pedophile to change, they counteract the effect that the use of drugs has
in encouraging the patient to see himself in a passive role dependent on the
133. West, supra note 91, at 264. Assertiveness training should be seen in the context of re-
education and skills training of which more will be written later.
134. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 194. There is some success reported by Dr. Crawford:
"Stevenson and Wolpe (1960) report three single-case studies, one of whom was a pedophile,
given assertiveness training. Treatment lasted for 45 sessions and on a six and one-half year
follow-up there had been no recurrence of deviant sexual behavior." Furthermore, "[A] more
recent single-case study on a pedophile (Edwards, 1972) reports similar success with only 13
treatment sessions of assertiveness training." Id.
135. For a complete description of all these techniques, see CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at
195-202. See generally, MARKS, supra note 125 for a particular review of programs seeking to
utilize behavior modification within the context of couples, even spouses.
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therapist for the solution to his problems.
3 6
In regard to the predicament of clergy-as offenders and as spiritual advi-
sors-behavior modification brought about through skills training is more
acceptable than sexual techniques. Even though data suggests that non-
learned biological factors contribute to sexually deviant behavior, 137 sexu-
ally dysfunctional persons who have social skills defects can be taught to
meet people and set limits on their behavior. While certainly not true of all
pedophiles, many have difficulty in maintaining relationships, communica-
tions, expression of feelings, role conflicts, and coping with anger. 38 Per-
haps many more would admit to feeling a stigmatism from early sexual
victimization forcing them into guilt and a sub-cultural mentality that af-
fected healthy and productive relationships.' 3 9  Social and skills training is
the means through which the pedophile seeks to develop a better approach
to life: social interaction, the -' 'lity to express emotions, cope with job in-
terviews, aggressive confron ati'ons and personal problem solving."4°
Individual and group therapy programs address these social skills to be
developed by persons with deviant sexual behaviors. The sessions will in-
clude gender role behavior, sex education and self control, with the least
known about the potential of self-control procedures as applied to sex of-
fenders.' 4 ' This should change in the future as all treatment programs in-
clude such therapy as part of a comprehensive approach. There is now
sufficient evidence that social skills should be a central part of any sexual
reorientation program; some programs report that "social skills training has
been found to be the most useful of all the treatment techniques employed
136. PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 91.
137. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 85, at 6. At a symposium at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, evidence was presented suggesting that "nonlearned biological factors may
be more important determinants of human sexual behavior than is generally appreciated." Id.
Such evidence has significant impact upon punishment and hormonal treatment programs
which offer evidence of "marked reductions in sexually deviant activity and fantasy" in pa-
tients. Id. at 7. The hormonal treatment program consisted of medroxy-progesterone acetate
discussed infra at 1935-37.
138. PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 87. The author suggests further
readings and studies commenting on skills training and how this will affect pedophilic
behavior.
139. For an explanation of this argument, see Plummer, supra note 87, at 234-35.
140. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 202.
141. While this form of behavior therapy would be most acceptable to many religious de-
nominations, one author admits that, "[t]he potential of self-control procedures with sex of-
fenders has not been fully exnlored and seems worthy of greater recognition." Id. at 205.
Procedures used in self control training include self-monitoring, self evaluation, self-reinforce-
ment, intention, statements and interpersonal contracting, but again, "little attention has been
given to the application of self-control techniques with sexual offenders." Id. at 204.
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and the most frequently used." '142
(3) Surgery
Defined succinctly, surgery as applied to pedophiles would include re-
moval of the testes (castration) so as to lower testosterone and thus decrease
the intensity of sexual cravings, which are directed towards children. "In
animals, lowering testosterone by means of removing the testes usually even-
tually leads to cessation of virtually all sexually motivated behavior,
although sometimes this may take as long as two years to occur."' 43 Similar
results are available in regard to humans. Thus, the surgical method of low-
ering testosterone has been shown through at least one study--done in Swit-
zerland-to enable many men to better control sexual appetite and still
allow them to perform sexually following castration. 1" This method of
treatment also has the lowest level of recidivism and does not rely upon the
initiative of the pedophile to maintain a pharmacological schedule.
This method of treatment would be rejected immediately by many reli-
gious denominations and various civil authorities as well. "Forced castra-
tion is clearly not acceptable as treatment in this country but has met with
some success elsewhere."' 45 In the United States, Constitutional protections
of privacy, due process, equal protection and cruel and inhuman punishment
would prohibit such treatment. Indeed, even in Germany, Switzerland, Nor-
way and Denmark studies conclude "that there is no scientific or ethical
basis for castration in the treatment of sex offenders, and it is stated that
consent to castration, based on the free decision of an inmate, may be a legal
fiction in some European c :-tr -s.' The choice, it is claimed, is 'between
two evils; loss of manliness ss of freedom through long-term imprison-
ment.' ,146 Even voluntary castration would be offensive to many religious
142. Id. at 207.
143. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 165. Neurosurgery as a means of decreasing sex-
ual appetite is still under investigation. There are discussions available concerning its rationale.
In a German study, surgeons operated on a hypersexual male who had been sentenced to a
prison term for molesting children, a heterosexual rapist and three homosexuals. "The two
hypersexual males had marked diminution of their sex drives immediately after the procedure
but in one the sex drive returned within six months of the operation; the homosexuals re-
ported complete loss of all homosexuality. Reported side-effects were few (no metabolic, hor-
monal or visual disturbances) and of the five, two had long-lasting, positive side effects:
substantial reduction in the psychopathy and increased insight into their behavior." PERSPEC-
TIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 90.
144. See BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7 at 166.
145. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 85, at 3. The success to which they refer is such stud-
ies as done in Switzerland.
146. PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 89.
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denominations; and for everyone, even the pedophile himself, there are ethi-
cal considerations.
(4) Medication
While the reduction of testosterone levels through castration was seen to
be effective in reducing sexual deviant behavior, it was also questionable
from the moral and ethical perspectives. Today there is a pharmacological
medication that can be injected intramuscularly once per week with similar
results. The medication is called medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA). The
effect is the same as castration: a reduction in the circulating levels of the
male sex hormone, testosterone. 147 But with MPA there are no permanent
effects; MPA use evidences mild lethargy, cold sweats, nightmares, hot
flashes and muscle aches. Even with these symptoms, any "effects appear to
be fully reversible within a few months after the medication is stopped."'14
Researchers conclude that MPA is the most useful drug available for con-
trolling sexual behavior, particularly because of its lack of side-effects. 149
While there is a level of satisfaction with medications such as MPA, the
drug is not a cure and it should not be seen as such.' 50 Indeed, any long
term effects of MPA have not been seen and there are some countries, such
as Australia, where the use of MPA has been banned because of the ethical
difficulty of simply "controlling" persons rather than "curing" them. 151 Re-
147. This is not the first drug with which treatment centers have experimented. There have
been others, such as butyrephenone, benperidol with chlorpromazine and placebos. None
were seen as effective. See e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 90-91. Dr.
David A. Crawford also discusses the use of drugs such as oestrogen and benperidol. See
CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 185-87.
148. Berlin & Meinecke, supra note 85, at 3. It is the permanence as well as the cruelty
that will affect the religious and the secular toleration of any medication.
149. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 187. See BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 166-67.
The drug, which is not feminizing, may cause an increased incidence of breast cancer in female
beagle dogs, and of uterine cancer in monkeys. It has been used in over eighty countries of the
world as a female contraceptive, supported in its use for this purpose by the World Health
Organization. No studies showing an increased risk of cancer in males (either humans or
animals) have been reported.
150. There is a high level of success with the drug from the perspective of recidivism. As
an example, "[o]f more than 70 men treated at The Johns Hopkins Clinic with MPA over the
past three years for some form of paraphilia (mostly pedophilia and exhibitionism), less than
ten percent have relapsed." BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 167. Again, this is not a cure
and the small percentage of recidivists would be problematical to a religious superior seeking
to assign a pedophile or to a religious counselor anguishing over possible further abuse to
children.
151. Dr. Berlin addresses the concern of some critics of MPA when they say that the drug
is "mind controlling" and thus ethically improper. He favors the use of the drug since it
confers upon persons the opportunity for increased self-control. Id. Also, "[t]he legitimate
medical indications for use of psychotropic drugs are (a) to decrease suffering (as in the case of
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searchers also caution that the dosage must be carefully monitored so that
some sexual activity is possible and non-deviant sexual desires fostered.
There is additional concern over the problem of ensuring that the patient
continues to take the drug. This is not a consideration with castration.'52
Also, if the patient does not appreciate the proper use of the drug, the pa-
tient could assume a passive role, dependent on the therapist for a solution
to the much greater problem." 3 Caution should surround the drug.
As we have seen, there are at present four major modalities of treatment
for pedophilia: (1) psychotherapy, (2) behavior therapy, (3) surgery, and
(4) medication. Of import for the cleric offender, as well as the cleric spiri-
tual advisor is the recognition that there is no cure, no guarantee, no means
by which a person may conclusively change his or her sexual orientation.
Whether pedophilic behavior results from biology, conditioning or both, the
common understanding is that the only response is a constant and profes-
sional comprehensive treatment program where the pedophile can "develop
strategies for more successfully resisting sexual and affectional tempta-
tions. ' 14 Punishment is not a cure and not a successful form of treatment;
it has the highest level of recidivism. Castration as a permanent alteration of
testosterone levels has ethical and moral problems for both secular and sec-
tarian society, in spite of the lowest incidence of recidivism and elimination
of reliance upon the patient to take medication.
Based on current medical evidence, the most encouraging trend is towards
comprehensive treatment programs aimed at all aspects of deviant sexual
behavior.155 Some, like active sex education utilizing alternate sexual part-
ners or techniques, will be seen as less available to religious denominations
for use with clerical offenders or spiritual counseling. But programs empha-
sizing skills training or sexual abstinence are within the choices available to
all denominations. Indeed, any efforts on the part of religious and secular
organizations to promote community self-help groups or greater education
antidepressant medications), (b) to restore function (as in the case of antipsychotic medica-
tions), or (c) to increase rather than decrease a person's capacity to successfully exercise self-
control as in the case of MPA." Id.
152. Dr. Berlin reports that persons on legal probation should be able to have access to the
drug just as they would if they were in prison. Id. Dr. Crawford reports that one means by
which this can be done is to provide the drug with twice a week therapy offered by the proba-
tion service. The meetings are mandatory and the importance of the drug is emphasized.
CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 187-88.
153. PERSPECTIVES ON PAEDOPHILIA, supra note 131, at 91.
154. BERLIN & KROUT, supra note 7, at 168.
155. CRAWFORD, supra note 122, at 205. The author identifies a series of reports stating
that comprehensive treatment is the best trend, but also stating that there is insufficient data to
estimate effectiveness and there is a great need for additional treatment centers and programs.
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concerning sexuality among the population as a whole would be welcome
and would be a form of treatment.
But within any comprehensive program there must be a consideration of
the use of medroxyprogesterone acetate. Secular society in the United States
has adopted it as a form of treatment. It is part of the predicament of
pedophilia that consideration be given to a medication that is not permanent,
that does operate as a complete sexual suppressor, that does provide a hiatus
in which other treatment can take place, but which does not confer conclu-
sive long term results or effects. The ethical consideration is one of human
dignity, and this aspect must permeate any religious denomination consider-
ation of medroxyprogesterone acetate.
Finally, clerics and the religious denominations to which they belong have
an argument in favor of privilege from reporting statutes because of the
availability of present-day treatment for pedophilic behavior.5 6 The medi-
cal evidence concerning pedophilia and the horrendous effect upon children
of such behavior justifies the necessity of an anonymous and personal oppor-
tunity for persons who experience compulsive pedophilic behavior to seek
and discover a program of treatment. This opportunity would be lost if the
reporting privilege were revoked and the pedophile denied a chance to con-
front through another person the necessity of change, reconciliation, treat-
ment. The reporting privilege provides a chance beyond criminal
incarceration for rehabilitation. Since the medical evidence states that there
are treatments available, anonymous confessional opportunities are one
means to meet this need for treatment among persons affected by compul-
sive pedophilic urges. Even beyond the arguments of the First Amendment,
privacy, or specific statutory protection, the medical evidence and possibility
of treatment offer unique justification for clerics retaining the privilege. 57
156. Professor Mary Hater Mitchell suggests three arguments the cleric might make to
justify the privilege from reporting: (1) requiring the cleric to report does not significantly
further the state's goal of protecting children; (2) even if requiring the cleric to report does
result in some additional reports of abuse, the state has alternate means of securing that infor-
mation; and (3) "undermining the confidential relationship between confiders and clergy will
defeat one valuable, nongovernmental means of achieving the state's goals of preventing and
treating child abuse." Mitchell, supra note 13, at 811. The medical treatment programs and
the ability of the cleric to suggest treatment-or require it as a condition of forgiveness-
bolsters the third argument the cleric may make in response to the state's attempted denial of
the clergy privilege.
157. Psychotherapists have also sought to use this argument: that anonymous therapy of-
fers a chance for the pedophile to change and the privilege should be retained for them. See
Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy, 1970 LAW &
Soc. ORD. 191; Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1980); Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychothera-
pist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893 (1982); Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A
Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978);
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III. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LAW PREDICAMENTS
A. Criminal Law
In 1984, a Florida pastor listened as a man confessed the sin of child abuse.
During the course of the confession, the pastor encouraged the man to turn
himself in to the police and the pastor even volunteered to accompany the
man to the police station. Once there the cleric did not make a statement
and did not file a report of child abuse. Later, when the man was on trial for
what he had done, the judge hearing the case directed the cleric to testify as
to what he had been told and the cleric refused, citing the privilege between
himself and the defendant, the priest-penitent privilege. The judge cited the
pastor for contempt and placed him in jail, 5 8 thus raising a modern di-
lemma that had been taken for granted since 1606 and the reign of King
James I.I59 The dilemma is a conflict between privilege accorded clergy con-
fessions and the need to identify child abusers.
While the 17th Century priest during the reign of King James was found
guilty of treason for refusing to speak of a plot to assassinate the monarch,
more recent cases, and especially ones in the United States have protected
the right of a cleric to withhold information. Courts have found that the
privilege can be rooted in freedom of religion, a state statute, free exercise
clauses of state constitutions or rules of evidence. Thus, in the 1813 Ameri-
can case of People v. Phillips, a priest refused to testify concerning how he
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Law and Other Professionals: Its Implications for Privi-
leged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962). Comment, Duties in Conflict:
Must Psychotherapists Reprort Child Abuse Inflicted by Clients and Confided in Therapy? 22
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 (1985). Pedophiles would refrain from seeking treatment for fear of
disclosure; psychotherapists would refrain from eliciting pedophilic incidents for fear of hav-
ing to disclose. Smith & Meyer, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Psychotherapy: A Time for
Reconsideration, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 351 (1984).
158. Florida v. Mellish, 84-9852CF810. The case was appealed to the 4th District Court of
Appeals in West Palm Beach (Mellish v. State of Florida, 84-1930) and while on appeal the
Florida legislature amended its Child Abuse Statute to exempt clergy and the case was dis-
missed sua sponte. See Ostling, Confidence and the Clergy, Time, Oct. 1, 1984, col. 1, at 66;
Silas, Embattled Clergy--Is Confession Always Private? 72 A.B.A.J. 36 (1986). Note also that
the offense was contempt, not the charge of failure to report an instance of child abuse. This
latter offense is more probable during the latter half of the 1980's, since it is a period of height-
ened sensitivity over child abuse.
159. The first case citing a priest-penitent privilege was reported in Garnett's Trial, 2 How,
ST. TR. 218 (1606) cited in 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 n.I (rev. ed. 1961). An argu-
ment can be made that the privilege dates as long as the seal of confession of the Roman
Catholic Church: "The confessor is wholly forbidden to use knowledge acquired in confession
to the detriment of the penitent, even when all danger of disclosure is excluded." COLLINS,
THE CODE OF CANON LAW IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION, CANON 984 (London 1983). See
Regan & Macartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged Comm., 2 CATH. LAW. 3, 4-12
(1956).
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had received stolen goods which he had surrendered to authorities. The
cleric objected to being forced to testify on the basis of his church's seal of
confession'6 ° and the court allowed his privilege based on the priest's free-
dom to exercise his religion granted by the New York State constitution.
161
Based partially on this rationale, the same court denied the privilege to a
Protestant minister four years later.' 62 Then later, in response to this ine-
quality, the New York legislature enacted the first statute granting a priest-
penitent privilege.' 63 Today, "forty-nine states, the District of Columbia,
and the Virgin Islands have statutes dealing with the priest-penitent privi-
lege."' 164 The statutes are an improvement over the common law, but the
160. The case is not officially published, but it is abstracted in 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843), and the
original records are available at the Court of General Sessions of the County of N.Y.. See also
Tinnelly, Privileged Comm. to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 198 (1955) [hereinafter Tinnelly];
Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 95 (1983) [hereinafter Yellin]; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (rev. ed. 1961).
161. The court wrote that:
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should be adminis-
tered-that its ceremonies as well as its essentials should be protected .... To decide
that the minister shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare that
there shall be no penance; and this important branch of the Roman Catholic religion
would be thus annihilated.
Tinnelly, supra note 159 at 209 (quoting People v. Phillips). The New York State constitution
also provided that the "free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, with-
out discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this state, to all
mankind." N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XXXVIII.
162. People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Rec. (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817). The fact that the Roman
Catholic Church had a definite history regarding secrecy of its sacramental confession and the
priest was adamant in asserting that fact offered a decisive difference between Smith and
Phillips.
163. N.Y. REV. STAT. 72, pt. 3, ch. VII, tit. III, art. 8 (1828): "No minister of the gospel,
or priest of any denomination whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to
him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice of
such denomination." For a detailed discussion of the early privilege and the reporting statutes
that followed, see Callahan, Historical Inquiry into the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 36 JURIST 328
(1976); Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55 (1963). Com-
parison is invited between the state's efforts to protect the privilege by statute when it was seen
in the public interest and more recent state efforts to abrogate the privilege through statute
when that public interest has been affected by the rising incidence of child abuse.
164. Comment, supra note 35, at 439. See also Model Code of Evidence Rule 219 (1942);
Univ. R. Evid. 505 (1974); Fed. R. Evid. 501, which allows for a federal interpretation:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or
defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in ac-
cordance with state law.
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statutes differ from state to state, "so that there is no typical clergy privilege
statute."'165 Indeed, with so many states seeking to modify the privilege so
as to foster more reporting as a response to the concern over child abuse,
state statues are changing each day. 166
Assuming that the privilege of priest-penitent is retained because of such
arguments as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, free-
dom of religion such as that found in the Phillips case utilizing a state consti-
tution, or even the argument suggested in this Article that the privilege
utilizes the medical testimony and assists the secular purpose of involving
abusers in treatment, there is still a restrictive tone to the privilege. Thus,
even though the privilege may be retained, it is likely that the statute grant-
ing the privilege will restrict the definition of who is a cleric, who is a peni-
tent, the nature of "confession", and who may waive the privilege.
167
Obviously an attorney, a physician, a therapist or a spouse is not a cleric
when performing those other functions. Privileges attaching to each of these
would be separate from the priest-penitent privilege and perhaps, when
viewed from the context of the First Amendment free exercise clause, have
165. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 740-41:
Colorado's statute, for example, is brief and narrow and limits the privilege to a
clergyman or priest and to confessions. Conversely, Maryland's statute is brief but
broad, providing that a cleric in an established church cannot be compelled to dis-
close any information told to him in confidence by a person seeking spiritual solace.
Indiana's brief statute bluntly declares clergy incompetent as witnesses as to confes-
sions or admissions made to them in [the] course of discipline enjoined by their re-
spective churches. By contrast, the Kansas statute expends over 360 words detailing
who counts as clergy, who counts as a penitent, and what communications are
privileged.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1973); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111
(1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983).
166. For a discussion of state reporting statutes and the elements within each that are being
affected by change, see text accompanying notes 36-41.
167. Prof. Mitchell discusses the four present versions of who may waive the clergy privi-
lege. See Mitchell, supra note 156, at 755-60. Even though religious denominations such as
the Roman Catholic Church would allow no waiver, (see CANON 983 (1), "The sacramental
seal is inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by
word or in any other manner or for any reason.") there are within state statutes four possibili-
ties. First, the cleric may not disclose; the cleric is treated as if he or she is incompetent to
testify. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Bums Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2156 (West Supp. 1986). Second, the cleric may not disclose without the penitent's con-
sent; here the penitent has the ability to assert the privilege or not. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (1978); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1)(c) (1987). Third, the cleric has the ability to
assert the privilege because the statute says that he or she may not be compelled to disclose.
See MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984).
Fourth, if the statute says that the cleric may not be forced to testify without the consent of the
penitent, then the cleric and the penitent must both object to the disclosure for the privilege to
apply. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
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less authority when discussed in the context of child abuse. 6 ' But denomi-
nations and clerics may not rely on an easy answer to the dilemma since the
exact meaning of present state statutes and the full panoply of the federal
free exercise clause have not been completely examined. 169 The statutes
must be read strictly; this is especially important since the statutes carry
with them both criminal penalties and civil responsibilities. So as to be in-
cluded within any availability of the priest-penitent privilege, the denomina-
tion and/or cleric must attend to who is a cleric,170 what is a "confessional
capacity," 1 7 l who is a penitent, 172 and the type of communication. 173 In
168. A strong argument can be made that the priest-penitent privilege is especially tenable
because of its free exercise basis, societal desire to foster such confidential relationships, and
the new jurisprudence concerning privacy. While other privileges may rely upon these or simi-
lar rationales, arguments in favor of the priest-penitent privilege seem distinctive. See Note,
The Attorney- Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and the Constitutional Entitlement, 91
HARV. L. REV. 464, (1977); Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss: The Mari-
tal Communication Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121 (1980); Shuman & Weiner, The Privilege Study:
An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C.L. REV. 893 (1982);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Law. and Other Professions: Its Implications for Privi-
leged Commommunications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962); Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956);
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professions: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597 (1980);
Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decisions, 64 CALIF. L.
REv. 1447 (1976).
,169. As regards free exercise, "[c]ase law provides little support for a free exercise ground-
ing for the clergy privilege." Mitchell supra note 156, at 796. Also, "[i]t is amazing that there
has been so little discussion on the possible constitutional basis for the clergy privilege." Id. at
793. If we utilize any of the new arguments for privacy the privilege seems to be included
because, "[i]f the privacy doctrine encompasses any rights to secrecy, communications to
clergy ought to be at the head of the line of privileges accorded constitutional status." Id. at
775. But such a claim must be associated with secrecy and religion for it to warrant the
umbrella of privacy protection. See Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 133 (1982); Note, Informational Privacy: Constitutional Challenges to the Col-
lection and Dissemination of Personal Information by Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 229 (1976); Comment, The Constitutional Right to Withhold Private Information,
77 Nw. U.L. REV. 536 (1982).
170. Even though most religious denominations define who is a cleric, statutes and judges
have impacted upon the creedal definitions. Thus, even though the Roman Catholic Church
would not regard a nun as a cleric, a Missouri court expanded the definition of "clergymen" to
include Sister Dominic who was acting as a spiritual director. Eckmann v. Board of Educ.,
106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985). But see In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889
(1971) (court denied a nun the priest-penitent privilege when asked to testify regarding confes-
sions made to her by a member of the church; the canons of the religions controlled who was a
cleric); Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981) (no privilege for communications
between patient and nun when she was contacted in the capacity of hospital administrator).
171. Not all statements made to a cleric are entitled to the privilege. United States v.
Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822, 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (business conversation with priest on leave
from church not privileged) aff'd, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Fuher, 100 Misc.2d
315, 419 N.Y.S.2d 426, (1979) (privilege not applicable to questions to rabbi concerning draw-
ing of checks while administrative employee of Yeshiva); State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822 (La.
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order to invoke the privilege, each of these factors must be addressed and
considered within the context of today's statutes. Failure to examine the
statute properly will result in such a conflict as to elicit criminal and civil
penalties from the state.
The issue is simple: If clerics are responsible under the state statutes for
reporting instances of child abuse, is the cleric immune from criminal prose-
cution under that reporting statute if another state statute grants to him or
her a privilege from reporting because of priest-penitent confidentiality? In
other words, once a reporting statute mandates reporting, is the cleric ex-
empt if he or she learns of the abuse during the course of a confessional
encounter? '74
Initially, this may seem to be a conflict of state statutes, one mandating
reporting and the other creating privilege, but because there are few federal
or state constitutional decisions, the issue has far greater ramifications. As
Professor Mary Harter Mitchell writes:
Unless a state has determined that clergy need not report abuses, it
1975) (no privilege for admissions made to minister present when defendant came to pawn a
watch because primary purpose of visit not to seek spiritual advice) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954
(1976); Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1978) (no privilege for comments
made to a minister as a friend), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); Burger v. State, 238 Ga. 171,
231 S.E.2d 769 (1977) (statements to a cleric who was a friend and companion of intent to kill
wife and her lover were not privileged).
172. The Kansas statute is quite specific as to "any person" who could be considered a
penitent:
Penitent' means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and
who seeks or receives ... advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or
her moral obligations, or in obtaining God's mercy of forgiveness for past culpable
conduct.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-429(a)(4) (1983).
173. This ingredient of the priest-penitent privilege is often vague because the state must
avoid recognizing one religion's definition of "confession" and not another's. There is a dis-
tinction made between counseling and confession; whether or not the privilege is destroyed if
there is a third person present; whether or not the privilege extends to observations or only to
words; and finally, whether or not the denomination requires confession or counseling. The
essential ingredient seems to be confidentiality: "all versions of the clergy privilege require
that the privileged communication be confidential. The communication is considered confi-
dential if the circumstances reasonably indicate the confider's expectation of secrecy." Mitch-
ell, supra note 155, at 750-51. See Knapp & VandeCreek, Privileged Comm. for Pastoral
Counseling: Fact or Fancy? 39 J. PASTORAL CARE 293 (1985). The District of Columbia
statute protects communications to a cleric "by either spouse, in connection with [any] effort
to reconcile estranged spouses without the consent of the spouse making the communication."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309(3) (1981).
174. Once again it is important to note that at no time does this article suggest that a cleric
should be immune from prosecution for the crime of child abuse itself if he or she is the
perpetrator of the crime. Any immunity from prosecution concerns that derived from any
applicable priest-penitent privilege applicable because the cleric "witnesses" the pedophilic act
of another during the course of a penitential session.
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must address an overriding concern: whether a cleric has a consti-
tutional right to maintain confidentiality in the face of a statutory
requirement. If such a right exists, the inquiry alters dramatically.
Legislatures contemplating statutory amendments and courts con-
struing statutes must still balance the reasons for reports against
the cleric's reasons for refusing to report. That balancing, however,
must comport with first amendment principles.
175
The consequences are severe; assuming that the issue cannot be resolved
through statutory construction, the cleric faces the possibility of incarcera-
tion if he or she fails to report and is not protected by the privilege. 176 More
than half of all the states have reporting statutes that contain language mak-
ing reporting a responsibility for clerics. Of course, if the cleric also serves
in another capacity-teacher, social worker, or counselor, for example-the
issue is further complicated because the reporting statute is almost certainly
applicable and there would be no priest-penitent privilege because of the
character of the communications. 177 All of these elements must be taken
into consideration; the bottom line being that over half the states have stat-
utes mandating reporting for clerics as clerics, most open-ended in scope
and without any clarification from other statutes or case law.
Once the state has adopted a reporting statute that could be read as in-
cluding a cleric, that same state may go even further and expressly state that
certain privileges shall not excuse mandatory reporting. Indeed, three states
175. Mitchell, supra note 156, at 793. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in
detail the various constitutional arguments inherent in any discussion of the first amendment
and the free exercise clause. Thus, I am further indebted to Professor Mitchell for her insights
and extensive comments. See Id. at 793-821.
176. Typical of the criminal penalties associated with failure to report is the California
statute:
Any person who fails to report an instance of child abuse which he or she knows to
exist or reasonably should know to exist, as required by this article, is guilty of a
misdemeanor and is punishable by confinement in the county jail for a term not to
exceed six months or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by
both.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172(e) (West 1986). In Texas the legislature has abrogated the priest-
penitent privilege and also utilizes an all-inclusive reporting requirement:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person has cause to believe that a child's
physical or mental health or welfare has been or may be further adversely affected by
abuse or neglect and knowingly fails to report ....
(b) An offense under this section is a Class B misdemeanor.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.07 (Vernon 1987).
177. It may seem odd that the states have allowed this confusion to develop in their crimi-
nal codes. Not so, writes Professor Mitchell. "Given the relative newness of reporting require-
ments and the paucity of case law addressing the tension, this oversight is not surprising."
Mitchell, supra note 156, at 787. Please note the confusion that resulted from the recently
inaugurated concern over abuse in gestation. Does the abuse statute apply to the fetus? See
supra text associated with notes 37-73.
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expressly abolish the priest-penitent privilege and a fourth can be read to do
the same.1 78 Thus, at present, in the states of Washington, Arkansas, Loui-
siana and Idaho the state legislature has expressly abolished the privilege as
a defense to any failure to report child abuse under the state's reporting
statutes. If a "priest" were to hear the "confession" of a "penitent" that
included an incident of child abuse and that priest did not report the inci-
dent in accordance with the reporting statute, the priest would be guilty of
criminal misconduct.
The states that have not expressly abrogated the privilege may include the
abolition as part of a general abrogation of all professional privileges, or at
least all except that between attorney-client. Thus, in Texas, the statute
reads:
In any proceeding regarding the abuse or neglect of a child or the
cause of any abuse or neglect, evidence may not be excluded on the
ground of privileged communications except in the case of commu-
nications between attorney and client.
179
Only a few states have expressly retained the privilege: Kentucky, Oregon
and South Carolina; a few more are silent as to the priest-penitent privilege,
thus implying that it is still in effect. But silence still connotes potential
conflict and presents a significant predicament for the cleric, caught among
the criminal offense, the responsibility to his or her religious duties, the per-
sonal abhorrence of child abuse and consideration of the medical needs of
the penitent.
This conflict is certain to result between the needs of the state in address-
ing the issue of child abuse and the free exercise [of religion] of the cleric.'" 0
As with the early case of People v. Phillips,' courts may construct a consti-
tutional guarantee of free exercise of religion, thus establishing the priest-
penitent privilege through constitutional interpretation, rather than statu-
tory provision. But the factual basis of Phillips is defined narrowly: a Ro-
man Catholic sacramental confession, a Roman Catholic priest, the New
York state constitution rather than the federal constitution, and a strict re-
178. See supra note 35.
179. Tex. Fain. Code § 34.04 (Vernon 1986). The North Dakota statute is more inclusive
but similar to that of Texas. The North Dakota statute reads:
Any privilege of communication between husband and wife or between any profes-
sional person and his patient or client, except between attorney and client, is abro-
gated and does not constitute grounds for preventing a report to be made or for
excluding evidence in any proceeding regarding child abuse or neglect resulting from
a report made under this chapter.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (1982).
180. U.S. Const. Amend. I: "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise
[of religion]."
181. People v. Phillips, N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813).
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quirement of secrecy understood by both priest and penitent. In today's so-
ciety the privilege is enjoyed by a much wider group of "priests" and the
constitutional arsenal much larger than it was during the early nineteenth
century. There are many more variables today.
Phillips will be the beginning of the constitutional argument. Today, the
issue will involve considerations of denominational support: dogma, creeds,
practices. "A cleric lacking church backing may ... have more difficulty
convincing a court that the asserted belief in secrecy is religious" '1 82 and
that the state reporting requirement infringes his religious beliefs. Thus,
while courts have not developed a specialized jurisprudence of free exercise
for professional clergy, the cleric who claims the privilege as part of an an-
nounced church dogma proclaiming confessional practice a part of the prac-
tice of religion is more likely to enjoy the protection of the privilege. It is
doubtful if the court would be able to make any inquiry 183 into the back-
ground or reason for such a religious dogma, but dogmatic formulations will
form the key to establishing any protection under any applicable state privi-
lege statute, or for establishing a free exercise argument that such a privilege
exists beyond state statutory authority, it exists in the state or federal consti-
tution. "The constitutional argument grows naturally from the Supreme
Court's free exercise decisions and accords with the momentous shared value
of religious liberty." 184
The balance between individual free exercise and compelling state interest
will be the constitutional battleground. We have seen the basis for the free
exercise rationale; the state's interest has been formulated through the medi-
cal evidence of child abuse in gestation, the rising statistics concerning child
abuse, the state's need to identify and commence treatment for offenders,
and the traditional concern of the state for the health and safety of its citi-
zens.' 8 5 Because of the inflammatory nature of pedophilia and the fact that
newspaper report new instances almost weekly, the balancing that will be
182. Mitchell, supra note 156, at 801. Specifically, Professor Mitchell suggests that church
groups "may be wise to adopt some official policy regarding the secrecy of confidential com-
munications to their clergy." Id. at note 423 infra. See Recommendations at 109.
183. The level of dogmatic inquiry available to a court is limited. As Professor Mitchell
writes: "Such a judicial inquiry threatens to entangle courts in religious questions that they
are practically and constitutionally incompetent to address. Yet a court is surely entitled to
determine whether the claimed infringement on religion is more than de minimis before requir-
ing a compelling state interest to justify the infringement." Mitchell, supra note 155, at 805-06.
184. Id. at 795-96. See Kelly, Beyond the Priest-Penitent Privilege: The Church, The FBI
and Privacy, 38 CHRISTIANITY IN CRISIS 28 (1978).
185. See Pepper, The Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIz. L. REV. 897 (1981); Areen,
Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and
Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975). These articles discuss the balancing of the state interest
with the individual rights of free exercise and liberty.
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done will perforce be done upon a turbulent societal base. Any successful
balancing must provide for the defined scope of the free exercise clause on
the one hand, and the compelling state interest to be definitively served by
the state regulation on the other hand. The state must establish that the
statute abrogating the clergy privilege or the statute mandating reporting by
clergy does in fact contribute to the state interest in lessening child abuse.
1 1
6
Furthermore, the state must establish that there are no alternative means
and that the present practice sought to be outlawed does in fact work against
the compelling state interest.18 7 Also, because the state should have the bur-
den of proof, the cleric should not have to present empirical data demon-
strating that the clergy privilege does in fact contribute to the state's
efforts. 8 ' Obviously however, empirical data would assist the argument that
the clergy privilege does assist the common good and deserves recognition in
statute.
There are few indications that the criminal law of any particular state will
be used to prosecute a cleric for failure to report an instance of child abuse
when the cleric discovers the abuse during a penitential discourse. But the
predicament exists. States have recently modified their reporting statutes to
include persons operating in clerical functions and the reporting statutes
mandate criminal penalties for failure to comply. Obviously, should a person
who happens to be a cleric learn of an instance of child abuse while function-
ing outside of a "confessional" capacity, said reporting statute would apply
and the cleric would have no defense for failure to report. But when there is
a reporting statute made applicable to the cleric and the cleric is functioning
as a cleric in a dogmatically defined "confessional" capacity, the cleric may
have recourse to the priest-penitent privilege against disclosure and be im-
mune from criminal prosecution.
186. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). All three cases required the state to show that the
means it had chosen to effectuate a particular end did, in fact, effectuate that end. When that
could not be shown, the state's statute was found to be unconstitutional..
187. Recognition of the medical evidence previously discussed in this article is a purported
effort to establish that the clergy privilege of secrecy actually assists the secular objective of
identifying abusers and lessening child abuse. The point being, that for many persons, "a
religious response to their problems, framed in the religious categories that are most deeply
meaningful to them, may be more effective than secular interventions." Mitchell, supra note
156, at 817. The religious availability of confession assists such persons and the secular objec-
tive of decreasing abuse.
188. Professor Mitchell argues that despite some language in a 1972 Supreme Court case,
"clergy should not need empirical data to prove that their disclosures of confidential communi-
cations will deter further confiding." Mitchell, supra note 156, at 813. See Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This argument should apply to all data requirements when such
requirements are used to interfere with constitutional protections.
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Today's predicament is whether or not there is a priest-penitent privilege
available to the priest through common law or statute or, in the state's desire
to lessen child abuse, has that privilege been abrogated. If the privilege is no
longer available, may the cleric nonetheless refuse to report because he or
she possesses a constitutionally guaranteed freedom to exercise religion and
his or her religion includes the secrecy of the confessional?18 9 Will this pro-
tect against criminal prosecution by the state?
There is no answer to the criminal law predicament of the cleric and the
reporting requirements recently inaugurated by the states."9 The litigation
involved will be expensive and extensive involving the balancing of state and
individual interests. Because of the possible emotional content of the child
abuse issue, adequate care and respect for all the issues involved is
recommended.
B. Civil Law
The consequences of failure to comply with the criminal reporting statutes
are awesome for the cleric. But with each criminal violation there arises the
compensatory and punitive damages associated with civil wrongs. For in-
stance, if a reporting statute places a responsibility upon a cleric to report all
instances of child abuse and the cleric learns of a child who has been repeat-
edly abused by a parent, does the cleric have a duty to report? Clearly the
answer is yes; the statute mandates reporting. 9 If the cleric does not re-
port, the cleric is guilty of a criminal offense. But further, if the cleric knows
of the incident and does not report and further abuse takes place causing
emotional and physical damage to the child, is the cleric liable for civil dam-
ages to the child? Does that liability result because of the statute's require-
189. While arguments can be made that there is a definite right to privacy within the Con-
stitution, such arguments would best be left to physicians, psychotherapists, and even attor-
neys. The cleric can retain such arguments while asserting his or her own unique protection
found within the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
190. Suggestions that reporting statutes be changed to allow permissive reporting if the
cleric wishes is not a solution to the predicament. One author has recommended the following
statute: "If the communication threatens harm to any person, the Clergyman may, but is not
required to disclose the communication to avoid occurrence of that harm." Yellin, supra note
160, at 156. If such an approach is feasible at all, perhaps a better suggestion would be to
make the privilege available in proportion to the dogmatic understanding of the cleric's church
or denomination, rather than relying upon a nebulous understanding of secrecy on the part of
the cleric.
191. It is important to note that in many Roman Catholic dioceses throughout the United
States, procedures have been implemented to notify the authorities immediately when any in-
stance of child abuse has been discovered. This is the case even though the alleged abuser is a
cleric or church employee. For a complete list of the procedures implemented, contact: Gen-
eral Counsel's Office, United States Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington D.C. 20005.
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ment that the cleric report? How can the cleric be responsible for the acts of
an abuser, a third person? Will the cleric be able to claim charitable immu-
nity because of his association with a religion? And finally, does the liability
of the cleric end if the cleric learned of the abuse during confession and not
during a casual setting? Or stated another way, is the reporting statute's
civil effects nullified in respect to a cleric because of the priest-penitent
privilege?
The civil predicament of the cleric in respect to the issue of child abuse is
also awesome. Because many of the issues raised in the criminal sphere have
not been addressed, the civil issues remain unanswered. Also, just as the rise
in the incidents of child abuse and the advances in medical technology have
caused states to issue new reporting statutes or to abrogate some if not all of
the professional privileges, so have they focused a stricter scrutiny upon
clergy and clerical responsibilities. Clerics are being incarcerated; bishops
are being sued, ministers are sued for malpractice and a rabbi asks in a law
review article: "Is the Cloth Unraveling?" 192 The answer is yes and no.
Yes, clerics will be held to the professional standard to which they aspire
and no, there is no loss of respect for the office. On the contrary, there is
sufficient respect to require accountability.
National newspapers record evidence of this civil accountability. On Sep-
tember 15, 1987, the parents of a youth who was sexually assaulted by a
priest of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, sued the Archdio-
cese and the priest for $6 million dollars compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.193 The suit, filed in D.C. Superior Court, "claimed that the church
was negligent for not detecting the priest's sexual problems that led to the
assaults." 194 On the West Coast, the parents of a 13 year-old Catholic
school student allegedly molested by a priest have filed a $110 million suit
against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Los Angeles, asserting that the
church and school officials repeatedly ignored the boy's pleas for help. 95
And in the middle of the nation, there was a $6.75 million damage settle-
ment in Lafayette, Louisiana; "Two civil grievances involving one priest in a
Midwestern diocese were recently settled for approximately $600,000, and
an Idaho case was settled for $25,000. " 196 All of the cases involve elements
192. Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FER-
NANDO V.L. REV. 47 (1981). The author suggests that the advances made in scientific knowl-
edge suggest that clergy have a minimum measure of education and training and not rely on
intuition or native ability alone. Malpractice is the consequence of acting otherwise.
193. Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1987, at B2, col 6. The priest had pleaded guilty to five counts of
sexual abuse and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.
194. Id.
195. L.A. Times, Dec. 14, 1986, Metro, Part 2, at 2, col. 1.
196. Nat'l Cath. Rep., May 30, 1986, at 15 col. 2.
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of intentional tort, negligence, statutory liability or a combination of all
three.
Certainly a cleric who abuses a child is liable for the criminal offense of
child abuse and he or she will be expected to satisfy the criminal penalties. 197
But what of the civil responsibilities of the offending cleric to the child for
the serious emotional distress caused by the offense? There is always the
civil claim of battery, and states now have statutes and various theories
which provide recovery for the intentional infliction of serious emotional dis-
tress.' 9 For instance, in Ohio the state's highest court, in recognizing inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort accepted that:
"one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes serious emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
bodily harm.'" 9 9 Under this theory, the child abused by a cleric or any other
person is likely to recover if the following elements are present:
(1) the abuser either intended to cause emotional distress or knew
or should have known that the actions taken would result in seri-
ous emotional distress to the child.
(2) the abuser's conduct was extreme and outrageous, it went be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and it can be considered as
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
(3) that the abuser's actions were the proximate cause of the
child's psychic injury, and
(4) that the mental anguish suffered by the child is serious and of
a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
197. One study concerning the criminal penalties given to nonviolent child molesters who
either plead guilty or are convicted by the courts, found that about 17% receive some prison
term, 24% are assigned to a mental institution for a time, and over 50% are placed on proba-
tion after conviction. RUTH S. & C. HENRY KEMPE, THE COMMON SECRET: SEXUAL ABUSE
OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 87 (1984).
198. While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop all of the theories concerning
tort liability for child abuse, current theories are presented. See Comment, Civil Remedies for
Victims of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 13 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 223 (1986); Annotation, Right of
Minor Child to Sue Parent or Person in Loco Parentis for Personal Tort, 19 A.L.R.2d 423
(1951); Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery
Rule and the Long Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191 (1985). Battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and statutory theories of negligence are the ones most favored.
199. Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369, 374, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (1983). The
case involved an action for compensatory and punitive damages by a vice-president and gen-
eral manager of a Toledo, Ohio, company. The plaintiff alleged that members of a local union
made menacing remarks to him and as a result plaintiff suffered severe physical consequences:
stomach pain, anxiety and a medical expense of $5,000. The Supreme Court of Ohio admitted
it was the last state to recognize the independent tort of the intentional infliction of serious
emotional distress and allowed plaintiff to now seek recovery upon that ground. Id. at 373,
453 N.E.2d at 6.
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While many of the discussions associated with pedophilic behavior state
that the intention of the abuser may not be to inflict any emotional or physi-
cal harm, but rather to develop a caring and intimate relationship, recovery
could still be obtained under the theory. Mental distress as a consequence of
abuse has been shown through the medical evidence presented and liability
for such an extreme outrage as fondling children is broader than intent.
"This is the type of conduct which commonly is given the name of willful or
wanton, or sometimes recklessness."2 °1 Harm can be foreseen, causation
can be proven, and society can be outraged because of the medical testimony
that is now available concerning the consequences of child abuse. The re-
sponsibility of the abuser for the civil consequences of child abuse can be
achieved through express theories or statutes concerning intentional torts.
20 2
But such an approach posits the liability of the abuser. Is there a liability
for one who knows, should have known, or reasonably suspects abuse? Here
the liability shifts from the abuser to the religious superior, the confessor in
the priest-penitent situation, the confidential relationship peer. The civil lia-
bility of the abuser is much more clear than the liability of the "one who
knows." Also, because of the uncertainty of the privilege protection under
the free exercise clause, the predicament of the clergy is especially
precarious.
This liability for "knowing" and not preventing future harm when there is
a duty to do so, has been established against physicians. Courts have al-
lowed statutory civil liability for failure to report abuse in addition to the
200. Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App.3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 98, 103-4 (1983). Unlike the labor
dispute facts of Yeager, this case involved a visitation dispute between parents. Even though
the court would not allow recovery by a father against his former wife for interfering with the
visitation rights in regard to a child, the court did list these elements as necessary to eliminate
the speculative nature of a claim made under the intentional infliction theory. See also RE-
STATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment d, § 77, comment j (1965).
201. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 60 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser reasons
that the law cannot provide recovery for every instance of abuse, but that does not mean there
is no way by which the law cannot compensate for a genuine, serious mental injury.
202. California, a state where many of the most innovative of the tort theories originated,
allows for the intentional infliction of emotional distress under the following test: A defendant
is liable for the particular harm he or she intended to cause when it occurs, whether or not it
was foreseeable that his or her conduct would bring about such harm. He or she is also liable
if he or she acted with reckless disregard of the probability of causing the harm. See Agarwal
v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 149, 603 P2d 58, 66 (1979); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965): "Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Dis-
tress, (1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm."
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criminal penalty of failing to report. In the case of Landeros v. Flood,2 °3
California had a Penal Code statute stating that every physician who has
under his care any person who may be suffering from an injury inflicted in
violation of any penal law of the state [this would include child abuse laws],
must report that fact by telephone and in writing to the local law enforce-
ment authorities and the juvenile probation department.2
Plaintiff in the case was seeking compensatory damages "for personal inju-
ries caused by defendants' negligence in failing to properly diagnose and
treat the condition from which plaintiff was suffering. "20 The condition
was battered child syndrome as evidenced by multiple bruises, a commi-
nuted spiral fracture of the right tibia and fibula, a nondepressed linear frac-
ture of the skull, abrasions and fear and apprehension. 2' Also, and this is
directly pertinent to the cause of action being brought against the "person
who knows," plaintiff asserted that the defendant doctor was "statutorily
liable" for failing to report when he was under an obligation to do so by the
state statute. "The purpose of that theory is manifestly to raise a presump-
tion that by omitting to report plaintiff's injuries to the authorities as re-
quired by law, defendants failed to exercise due care-a presumption now
codified."' 207 The defendant physician had the duty to rebut that presump-
tion 20 and it is no defense that he may claim exemption from reporting
203. 17 Cal.3d 399, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 551 P2d 389 (1976). The case cites articles in sup-
port of the liability placed upon those who have a duty to report, do not do so, and harm to a
plaintiff results after the discovery. See Isaacson, Child Abuse Reporting Statutes: The Case
for Holding Physicians Civilly Liable for Failing to Report, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743 (1975);
Ramsey & Lawler, The Battered Child Syndrome, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 372 (1974); Fraser,
A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRiM. L.
REV. 103 (1974); Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1967); Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse,
49 CAL. ST. B.J. (1974).
204. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 11161-11161.5 (West 1970). In addition to physicians, health
care professionals, school officials, teachers, child care supervisors and social workers also have
a duty to report. Note that many states are moving towards a reporting requirement for "any
person."




208. The presumption is found in Cal. Evid. Code § 669 (West 1965):
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to persons or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of
the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was
adopted.
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under the physician-patient privilege. The code specifically exempted the
physician from any criminal or civil liability for making a report,20 9 thus
depriving him of the defense of the privilege.
The court allowed the case to go to the jury because the statute providing
a duty to report also provided a civil cause of action against any person who,
having a duty and knowing of a reportable offense, failed to report. The
legislature viewed this as a means by which child abuse may be lessened
through expanded reporting requirements. The criminal and civil penalties
follow from that compelling state interest.
As with a physician, so too with a psychologist. In another California
case, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,21° the court decided
that: "When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his pro-
fession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of vio-
lence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the
intended victim against such danger." '211 This common law duty to report-
if this will exercise reasonable care--creates in the psychologist as well as the
physician, a civil liability to those injured. Because this liability is directed
towards the "person who knows," rather than the person who commits the
abuse, the liability for injury proximately resulting from child abuse is ex-
panded to include the superiors and associates of the cleric. Also, and this
has yet to be determined, it potentially includes that matter revealed in con-
fession, for this will involve a cleric in the act of knowing. Certainly it in-
cludes the cleric acting as counselor alone.
An important distinction must be made and a conclusion drawn. When a
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might rea-
sonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circum-
stances, who desired to comply with the law.
209. Cal. Penal Code § 11161.5 (West 1970). Note that no mention is made of the ethical
responsibility of the physician to maintain the confidentiality of the client. Although this ethi-
cal duty is not identical with the free exercise religious demands of a religious denomination, it
is a consideration to many physicians. The court interprets the legislative action in mandating
reports as saying it is in the best interest of the client that the report be made, thus directing
the physicians toward a different responsibility than confidentiality and privileged
communications.
210. 13 Cal.3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr 129 (1974), aff'd, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d
334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). See also Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1025 (1974); Note, Tort Law-The Psychiatric Duty
to Warn: Cairl v. State, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 513 (1983); Note, Psychotherapists and the Duty
to Warn: An Attempt at Clarification, 19 NEw ENG. L. REV. 597 (1984).
211. 17 Cal.3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976). The court re-
jected arguments based on privacy, privilege, and confidentiality in treating mental illness, and
decided that the paramount interest was protecting persons from violent attacks. Id. at 440
n.12, 551 P.2d at 346 n.12, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.12 (1976).
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minister, rabbi or priest enters into the specific relationship known as "con-
fession", this is not the same as counseling. Words such as reconciling, for-
giveness, penance and contrition are associated with the former and not with
the latter. It is safe to conclude that if the priest-penitent privilege is sus-
tained through first amendment free exercise arguments or through express
state statutes, thus protecting the "one who knows" from criminal and civil
liability, the protection will only apply if there is a clear and distinct "confes-
sional" relationship between the abuser or the abused and the "one who
knows." If the abuse is discovered during the course of counseling or an-
other "confidential" discourse, but not within confession, liability will result;
if the "one who knows" is a cleric but at the time of learning of the abuse is
serving as another professional and that profession is not protected under a
privilege statute, liability will follow. Indeed, in addition to the civil liability
established in cases such as Yeager and Tarasoff, recent cases have debated
the issue of "clergy malpractice" for negligence during counseling sessions.
Today, clerics who seek to counsel-and this would especially pertain to
the complex issues surrounding the medical treatment of pedophiles---con-
front the issue of civil liability for negligent counseling. If counseling is in
fact different from "confession" then privilege will not apply, the cleric will
most likely have a duty to report, and civil liability will result from failure to
do so under one of the theories previously enounced or from clergy malprac-
tice resulting from the counseling session.
In the California case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Val-
ley,212 a young man, Kenneth Nally, began meeting on an irregular basis
with the pastor of Grace Community Church to discuss problems with his
girlfriend and his father. The young man had a history of depression for at
least three years prior to these meetings. At one point the man was admitted
to the hospital after an attempted suicide. There the pastor told him to co-
operate with the psychiatrists at the hospital, but he refused; the pastor then
recommended that he undergo tests at a hospital to determine if there were
any physical causes for his depression. He did not go to the hospital.
Shortly afterwards, he entered a friend's apartment and committed suicide.
The parents sued Grace Community Church and the pastors under the Cali-
fornia Wrongful Death statute asserting three claims: clergy malpractice,
212. 157 Cal. App.3d 912, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984). The case prompted a great deal of
controversy. See Note, Religious Counseling-Parents Allowed to Pursue Suit Against Church
and Clergy for Son's Suicide-Nally v. Grace Community Church, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 213 (1985)
(author concluded that the free exercise clause would protect the defendants from liability);
Comment, supra, note 127 (author also argues that the First Amendment protections and
public policy outweigh any examination by a state court of claims of malpractice by clergy).
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negligence and outrageous conduct.213 In essence, the parents alleged that
by virtue of his counseling and omissions, the pastor was negligent in failing
to exercise the standard of care for a clergyman of his sect and training in
the community, which proximately resulted in the young man's suicide. 214
The California Code of Civil Procedure section 377 provides that the heirs
or personal representatives of a decedent may bring an action against the
person whose negligent or wrongful conduct caused the death.21 5 It is an
action to compensate the survivors for pecuniary loses of support, society,
comfort, care and protection provided by the deceased.2 16 In the Nally case
the issue is whether the defendant should be held liable for the injury to
which the defendant has made a substantial contribution, when the injury
was brought about by a later cause of independent origin.217
The California court decided that this was an issue that could go to trial
because: (1) substantial facts existed as to whether the pastors engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct, either intentionally or recklessly, and
whether their counseling was a substantial factor in causing the young man's
death; (2) the plaintiff-parents adequately pled a cause of action based on the
wrongful death statute because they alleged that the pastor and church,
while knowing that the young man was depressed and had suicide tenden-
cies, recklessly exacerbated his feelings of guilt, anxiety, and depression, and
that the defendants acted without considering that their conduct would in-
crease the likelihood that the young man would commit suicide; and (3) the
first amendment free exercise clause did not license intentional infliction of
emotional distress in the name of religion and could not isolate defendants
from liability for a suicide caused by such conduct.218
Theories upon which Nally rests have resulted in clergy malpractice insur-
213. Id. at 309.
214. Id. at 309-10.
215. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1984). Recall that under the common law,
death terminated all causes of action the decedent might have had for personal torts, and gave
rise to no personal cause of action. Therefore, the right to recover for another's wrongful
death and the right to recover on a cause of action that survives the decedent are purely
statutory. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
216. See e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977);
Dickinson v. Southern Pacific Co., 172 Cal. 727, 158 P. 183 (1916).
217. See e.g., Comment, Civil Liability for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, 12 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 967, 974 (1979); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 215 at 301, asking: Why
should the defendant be relieved of liability for something as to which the defendant's conduct
is a cause, along with other causes?
218. Nally, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 308-09. The court separated the free exercise clause into the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The conduct of the pastors and the church in Nally
fell into the latter classification.
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ance, 219 and yet another appraisal of the free exercise protection of clerics
and their role as counselors. Note however, that "the precise issue presented
in Nally-whether the free exercise clause can shield a defendant from lia-
bility in common law tort action-has never been presented to the Supreme
Court for resolution." '22  This places the cleric in a tenuous predicament,
offering the possibility of extensive constitutional litigation, maintenance of
insurance, refusal to do counseling, or offering counseling only in the context
of the confessional. It places the denomination or church with which the
cleric is associated to also seek protection through insurance, doctrines such
as charitable immunity, or statutes imposing a limitation upon the time
within which the suit may be brought.
Clerics and the churches with which they are associated have found some
protection within established immunity doctrines. For instance, in spite of a
particularly harsh dissent,2 21 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
state's charitable immunity act barred the claim by the beneficiary of chari-
table activity from bringing suit against the charity based on negligent hir-
ing. In the case of Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, the
Archdiocese had hired a Brother Edmund as an instructor at a school and as
a scoutmaster for the Boy Scout group sponsored by the parish. During the
spring and summer of 1978, Brother Edmund forced an 11 year-old boy to
engage in sexually provocative activities and in sexual contact with him,
threatening the boy not to tell his parents. In fall the boy told his parents
and they immediately notified the Archdiocese.222
219. See generally Marty, Ministerial Malpractice, 96 CHRISTIAN CENT. 511 (1979);
Breecher, Ministerial Malpractice, LIBERTY Mar.-Apr. 1980. Three major Christian denomi-
nations now have or provide malpractice insurance coverage for their clergy: the United Pres-
byterian Church, the United Methodist Church, and the Lutheran Church in America.
Comment, supra, note 127 at 511-12.
220. Note, supra, note 212 at 234. But while the Supreme Court has not made a pro-
nouncement, lower courts have decided that the free exercise clause does not eliminate liability
when the challenged action violated a strong public policy or represented a danger to the
individual's health or well being. Id.
221. Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 535, 472 A.2d 531, 536 (N.J.
1984). The dissent found that the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act was not applicable to
the facts of that particular case which included an intentional tort: the negligent hiring, super-
vision and retention of potentially harmful employees by the entity constitutes an exception to
the rule of charitable immunity.
222. Id. at 531, 472 A.2d at 532. The complaint stated that Brother Edmund required the
boy to swim in the nude, provided him with pornographic magazines, provocative under-
wear-which he was required to wear-and then demanded physical contact to include the
boy manually masturbating Brother Edmund. The complaint also stated that the boy's
brother, two years older, had also been abused by Brother Edmund while at the camp. The
brother had posed for photographs, entered into deviant sexual conversation, and Brother Ed-
mund would masturbate in the brother's presence. See Complaint at 1, Schultz v. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese, No. L-12608-80 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. 1981), aff'd, No. A-04606-
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Throughout the winter and spring of 1979, the boy received extensive psy-
chiatric and medical care and was hospitalized. Finally, in May 1979, the
boy committed suicide by taking drugs.22 3 The parents sought compensa-
tion for the boy's suffering and for their own damages, claiming that the
Archdiocese was negligent, reckless, and careless in hiring Brother Edmund
and permitting him to have young boys under his care, in failing to deter-
mine his prior employment history, in failing to supervise him, and that the
defendant was otherwise negligent.22 4 The church replied that because they
were a charity, the parents' complaint was barred by the New Jersey immu-
nity act.
225
While admitting that, "The protection of charitable organizations from
liability in damages for otherwise just claims arising from their negligence is
losing support throughout the country",22 6 the court decided that the suit by
the parents was barred by the immunity statute. Finding that a "statute
should be construed in light of probable legislative intent in the context of an
evolving common law",22 7 the court decided that the statute was enacted by
the legislature to protect the charity from the ordinary negligence of its em-
ployees. 228 The dissent and commentators have criticized the holding be-
cause it does not take into account the, intentional character of the
80-TOI (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982), aff'd. 95 N.J. 530, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) [hereinafter
Complaint].
223. Id. The complaint also stated that the Archdiocese notified the boy's parents that it
would help with the medical expenses, provided that the matter was not made public. See
Complaint, supra note 222, at 6.
224. Id.
225. In 1958, New Jersey has abolished the common law charitable immunity doctrine and
replaced it with a statute that reads in part:
No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious,
charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be
liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negli-
gence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such
person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corpora-
tion, society, or association; provided however, that such immunity from liability
shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of such
corporation, society or association or of its agents or servants where such person is
one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corpora-
tion, society, or association; but nothing herein contained shall be deemed to exempt
the said agent or servant individually from their liability for any such negligence.
N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-7 (West Supp. 1987).
226. Schultz at 538, 472 A.2d at 534. Dean Prosser notes that "[tihe immunity of charities
is clearly in full retreat." PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs at 787- 89 (2d ed. 1955).
227. Id. at 539, 472 A.2d at 536.
228. Id. But the court leaves open the consequences of whether immunity should cloak
those with a reckless disregard for the safety of others. Id. The court also states: "Perhaps
the time has come for the Legislature to consider again the scope of the law and its intended
application to new theories of liability. Id.
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defendant-employee's acts.229
These persons who think that the Archdiocese should be brought to trial
for its negligent hiring of Brother Edmund, argue that the New Jersey stat-
ute was based upon the common law immunity doctrine and that, "It is
evident that in the commission of an intentional tort, the wrongful conduct
is so far removed from the beneficent purposes of the charity that it would
serve no salutary societal goal to accord immunity from liability. The im-
munity protects the charity in its normal endeavors, and not in activities that
are antithetical to its charitable ends."' 230 The significance of Brother Ed-
mund's willful conduct in sexually abusing the boy was not lost on the dis-
sent or on the commentators; it is not lost on society or the legislatures
enacting such immunity statutes. Furthermore, the liability of those who
"should have known" is seen as the more proper forum for recovery since it
is here that the economic loss can best be redressed.
Should the church or cleric involved with the predicament of pedophilia
be without the protection of such charitable immunity doctrines as that just
described in New Jersey, the liability of "one who knows or should have
known" will be decided in court. For instance, two years before the Schultz
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided DiCosala v. Kay 23, and
229. See Note, Torts-Charitable Immunity-Exception for Negligent Hiring Does Not Ex-
ist Under New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Act, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 907, 924 (1985):
"Given the edict that the immunity statute was not intended to expand the common law, the
failure of the Schultz majority to note the absence of any prior case granting immunity from an
intentional tort is shortsighted." Id.
230. Schultz at 549, 472 A.2d at 541-42. In relying upon a public policy basis and thereby
associating charitable immunity with the specific purpose of the charity, surely the actions of
Brother Edmund, providing no benefit to the abused boys, were not protected by the state
statute. But does this address the nature of the tort involved: the tort of negligent hiring? The
dissent does not resolve this, but does say that "... our [New Jersey] courts had not defini-
tively resolved the question of whether negligent hiring is an exception to the immunity doc-
trine." Id. at 554, 472 A.2d at 544. And again, "[w]e had no occasion, however, to deal with
the specific tort of negligent hiring' with respect to the wrongful conduct of an employee acting
beyond the scope of his employment and beyond the reach of the respondeat superior doc-
trine." Id. at 555, 472 A.2d at 545. But the dissent concludes nonetheless that "negligence [in
hiring] clearly undermines the essential capacity of the charity to do charity and to benefit its
intended recipients." Id. at 556, 472 A.2d at 545. "Such negligence on the part of a charity
properly stands as an exception to the immunity conferred by statute." Id.
231. Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 450 A.2d 508 (1982). This case also involved the tort
of negligent hiring or retention of incompetent, unfit or dangerous employees. A young boy
had been accidentally shot in the neck in the living quarters of his uncle, a camp ranger, on
Boy Scout campgrounds. A 19 year-old camp counselor had fired the pistol in jest and the boy
had suffered "severe and crippling injuries." Id. at 165, 450 A.2d at 511. The parents of the
boy filed suit against the Boy Scouts for compensation and the Boy Scouts moved for a sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the counselor was not acting within the scope of his em-
ployment at the time of the accident. Also, as a charity they were protected under the New
Jersey immunity statute. Id. at 167, 450 A.2d at 512.
Pedophilia
found that, "An employer whose employees are brought into contact with
members of the public in the course of their employment is responsible for
exercising a duty of reasonable care in the selection or retention of its em-
ployees."'232 And in a statement that would apply to the facts of the Schultz
case: "IT]he negligent hiring theory has been used to impose liability in cases
where the employee commits an intentional tort . . . where the employer
either knew or should have known that the employee ... might engage in
injurious conduct toward third persons.
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The New Jersey court reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant Boy Scout Camp and allowed the case to go to the jury to
determine the negligence of the Camp in hiring its employees. The court
allowed to stand the decision that the Camp was not protected under the
state's immunity statute because the injured boy was not a beneficiary of the
charitable entity.2 34 Also, "a higher degree of care is often required to be
exercised towards young children than to adults similarly situated., 235 A
greater degree of care is required with respect to dangerous instrumentali-
ties, in this case the pistol and the fact that the camp knew that its employee
kept pistols on the Camp grounds.236 In summary, the charitable Boy Scout
Camp was not protected by the charitable immunity statute existing in New
Jersey, public policy considerations surrounding guns and children affected
the court's decision, and the tort of negligent hiring was allowed to go to the
jury for its deliberations concerning negligence and liability. The charity is
left with few defenses.237
232. Id. at 171, 450 A.2d at 514. Furthermore, "[i]f liability results it is because, under the
circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in select-
ing the person for the business at hand." Id. When an employer neglects this duty and as a
result injury is occasioned to a third person, the employer may be liable even though the injury
was brought about by the wilful act of the employee beyond the scope of his employment.
Fleming v. Bronfin, 80 A.2d 915, 917 (D.C. Mun. App. 1951).
233. Di Cosala 91 N.J. at 173, 450 A.2d at 515. The test announced by the court was:
"whether a reasonably prudent and careful person, under the same or similar circumstances,
should have anticipated that an injury to the plaintiff or to those in a like situation would
probably result from his conduct." Id. at 517-18. The fact that the Boy Scouts had hired the
uncle of the camp counselor and knew that the uncle owned guns, that the camp counselor had
access to the home of the uncle where the shooting took place, placed upon the Boy Scout
Camp a duty to the plaintiff-boy. The issue was whether or not the camp had breached that
duty by hiring and retaining the uncle.
234. Id. at 167, n.5, 450 A.2d at 512 n.5.
235. Id. at 180, 450 A.2d at 519 (citations omitted).
236. Id. at 179, 450 A.2d at 518 (citations omitted).
237. In addition to the need to effectuate professional hiring practices, charities could
achieve some protection through insurance and, in the case of child abuse, a recent public
concern over unfounded allegations of child abuse. See Besharov, Unfounded Allegations-A
New Child Abuse Problem, 83 PUB. INTEREST, 18,19 (1986): "The nation's child protective
agencies are being inundated by unfounded' reports; about 65% of all reports must be dis-
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Just as criminal liability can result for the abuser and the "one who
knows" and has a duty to report the abuse, so can civil liability in tort result
for these same persons. While the abuser is responsible for the intentional
infliction of emotional harm, the "one who knows" is responsible for civil
liability resulting from the statutory duty to report. Also, even if that duty
to report is negated by the free exercise argument that the abuse was discov-
ered in a confessional setting, there remains a civil responsibility for negli-
gent hiring or retention of persons who could "reasonably be suspected of
committing harm to others." Is there immunity under an applicable charita-
ble immunity statute? Increasingly, the answer is no. May the charitable
employer say that it learned of the "unreasonable" behavior of its employee
within a confessional setting and that it may not use such knowledge to the
detriment of the penitent-employee? The free exercise clause has not been
tested to give an answer. But the consequences to the employee, the em-
ployer, and certainly the public are severe and at present the only response
to the possibility of litigation and injury is extreme prudence. The predica-
ment surrounding the clergy is newly discovered and yet ancient in origin.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
All recommendations as to what to do in light of the legal predicament of
clerics confronting the issues surrounding pedophilia pertain to the cleric
and those working with the cleric to effectuate his or her ministry. This
Article has consistently demonstrated through discussions of the expanded
definition of child abuse, the developing comprehensive programs available
to pedophiles, the unsettled nature of the free exercise clause and expanded
tort theories, that the predicament of the cleric is not available to easy or
quick solution. Also, because the issue is so volatile, solution will continue
to be exasperated. But that does not suggest that an attempt cannot be
made. Indeed, churches and clerics have already taken steps to address the
issues surrounding pedophilia and these recommendations that follow are
offered as complementing those.
First. Clerics and religious denominations must examine ministry forma-
tion programs and continuing education efforts. Within all programs there
must be an effort to identify and provide treatment for those persons affected
by pedophilic tendencies. Such a recommendation encompasses the duty the
cleric and the denomination owes to the person who could be abused, the
missed after an investigation." Responding to false charges of abuse, "a national group of
parents and professionals has been formed to represent those falsely accused of abusing their
children. Calling itself VOCAL, for Victims of Child Abuse Laws, the group publishes a
national newsletter and has about 3,000 members in almost 100 chapters formed or being
formed." Id. at 32-33.
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dignity of the potential abuser, and the integrity of the denomination itself.
Ignoring the fact that persons in every profession are possible abusers and
that any stereotype of an abuser as a "dirty old man" is simply incorrect;
the medical evidence and recent cases testify to the fact that pedophiles are
presently clerics and there are certainly more in formation programs seeking
to enter the clerical profession. Persons responsible for formation or em-
ployment must take decisive action.
Second. Clerics and religious denominations must apply strict measures
of accountability. If there is a permissive atmosphere to religious dogmas
concerning morality and behavior, these dogmas should be clarified. The
inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the criminal and civil prosecution
of clerics and denominations is that society will not condone conduct found
to be socially repulsive; the free exercise clause protects beliefs and not
conduct.
Third. Dogmas or creedal formulas concerning penance or "confession"
should be examined within the context of therapy, privacy, confidentiality,
and religious significance. While the free exercise issues have not been re-
solved in reference to confession v. reporting, confession v. hiring of an em-
ployee, or confession v. privilege, the present cases indicate that the stricter
the association with religion, the more likely will the protection of the free
exercise clause apply.
Fourth. Although changes in society should never be used as an excuse to
explain the behavior of a cleric or religious denomination, increases in pov-
erty among children, single-family households, sexual promiscuity, advances
in medical technology and the presence of a litigious society all contribute to
the cleric's predicament. Isolation cannot be tolerated on the part of a
cleric. Education must encompass how these societal factors affect the
cleric's role, the manner in which he or she is perceived and the dangers to
be avoided or at least anticipated. Education as prophylactic must be
fostered.
Fifth. Clerics and denominations should initiate procedures by which
they can respond honestly, immediately and conclusively to all allegations of
child abuse. This would include: (1) Distribution of state reporting statutes
to all clerics and all those employed by a denomination that could come
within the scope of the reporting statute; (2) Educating those with a report-
ing requirement as to the nature and definition of abuse and the Battered
Child Syndrome; (3) Providing strict precautions in the hiring of employees,
especially when those employees affect children. Current employees should
also be examined; (4) Provide for the proper notification of the authorities
whenever any instance of child abuse is discovered outside of the most
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strictly defined confessional setting; (5) Provide for the equitable and
prompt treatment of the alleged abuser pending the determination of the
complaint; (6) Respond to the abused person with dignity and promptness,
with strict procedures for determining veracity and perspective.
Sixth. Identify, train and support a person within the denomination to
address the human aspects of the cleric's life. Alcohol and drugs are often
associated with the pedophile and these should be seen as warning signs of
possible pedophilic activity. Thus, these problems should be addressed im-
mediately. The resources of the faith-spiritual community, and where appli-
cable, fraternal correction, should be utilized. Religious superiors are not
solely responsible for support and correction. In addition, clerics and de-
nominations should take advantage of existing support groups or initiate
such efforts. These would include Alcoholic Anonymous, Narcotics Anony-
mous, Weight-Watchers and in some localities there are groups for
pedophiles.
Seventh. If a secular purpose can be attributed to the religious practice of
confession, and that purpose is to provide an anonymous forum for the
pedophile to confront his or her compulsion, then the confessor must be
educated as to making recommendations concerning treatment. This is not
a recommendation that the confessional setting be transformed into a coun-
seling opportunity; such a transformation would have an effect upon the
priest-penitent privilege and the possibility of clergy malpractice. Nonethe-
less, education of the clerical confessor must include alternative forms of
treatment consonant with a possible religious objective of not sinning again.
Medical technology has provided assistance in this regard and confessors
should be made aware of the possibilities. The cleric and the denomination
should also consider the moral significance of many current modalities of
treatment.
Eighth. Clerics must be educated as to distinctions to be made today
within the law. For instance, the new theories of clergy malpractice, civil
and criminal penalties associated with the reporting statutes, privacy issues
and consequences of revealing matters that the "penitent" considers confes-
sional or at least confidential and the cleric thinks dangerous enough to dis-
close to authorities. Penalties for child abuse and, where applicable, church
canons should be made available to the cleric.
Ninth. Denominations should apprise themselves as to the current law
surrounding charitable immunity, tort responsibility, and statutory privilege
and reporting requirements. Once done, they should work in an ecumenical
effort to respond to society's sense of crisis with positive support and con-
structive suggestions.
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Tenth. As part of its duty to educate all concerned, clerics and denomina-
tions should assist parents in providing a program of sex education so that
children will understand appropriate adult behavior towards them. Since it
has been demonstrated that the prior existence of pedophilic activity in a
child contributes to future activity, it is necessary to discourage any such
activity from taking place. Acknowledgement that difficulties in the home
and society will result in more potential for abuse, invites religious denomi-
nations to take a more aggressive role in educating the young in human
sexuality.
CONCLUSION
It is plausible to estimate that medical technology contributed to the pres-
ent legal predicament of clerics in reference to pedophilia. Science has made
it possible to identify the symptoms of child abuse and predict its conse-
quences; science has made it possible to debate the criminal and civil liabil-
ity of a woman's conduct towards her fetus when that conduct concerns
alcohol, sexual habits, diet or narcotics; science brings us to the brink of
treating the pedophile with dignity, but affords us no permanent cure; sci-
ence calculates the pain and suffering of the abused child and his or her
parents for the civil court, but also predicts the continued compulsion of the
pedophile incarcerated; and finally, science justifies the cleric's claim to cer-
tain evidentiary privileges, but then denies the cleric any utilization due to
the sexual or moral nature of the treatment. Surely science shall continue to
pester the cleric and the legal predicament of pedophilia.
The legal process in the federal and state courts also contributes to the
predicament. The lack of a clear and objectional formulation of the freedom
of a person to exercise his or her religion places the cleric in the same tenu-
ous dilemma as the woman seeking to know the parameters of privacy and
potential consequences of fetal abuse. Likewise, distinctions made among
confession, counseling, spiritual guidance, psychotherapy and medical and
legal services are confusing and invite the courts or the legislators into those
activities forming the core of any penumbra of American society. Surely the
debate over privacy, judicial restraint or activism, and compelling state in-
terest will all affect the legal predicament of clerics and pedophilia.
Society too contributes to the predicament. The catastrophic increase in
the number of abused children-with the sure knowledge that many inci-
dents of abuse are not reported-demands a response. In those instances
where the abuser is a cleric, he or she is entitled to the treatment afforded
any citizen, no more or less. But in a society that has become affected by
poverty, illegitimacy and change in the historical definition of family, the
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definition of "one who knows" expands to include denominations, legislators
and citizens. All have a responsibility to protect the best interest of children.
Protection of this best interest is provided in the criminal sanction against
the abuser. But all should be aware of the medical technology available so as
to rehabilitate the pedophile in a manner that protects the dignity of the
person and the prevention future abuse. Stereotypical assumptions should
be displaced with facts. And while the criminal law may also require per-
sons in particular situations to report all instances of abuse, requirements of
reporting should safeguard the traditional and fundamental heritage of a
constitutional form of government. Emotion should not obfuscate privileges
intrinsic to explicit constitutional rights. Certainly the secular purposes of
some of those privileges deserve better examination and debate as well.
The civil liability of the abuser is both recent and often overlooked in
favor of the greater economic resources of the "one who knows." But just as
in criminal prosecution, should the abuser batter or intentionally inflict emo-
tional harm upon a child, society has a right and a duty to provide for re-
dress. Much of the medical evidence suggests that the abused child may
suffer in perpetuity; the abuser initiates a succession of pedophilic acts. The-
ories that redress this civil harm are compelling and warranted. So too, the-
ories that provide for a presumption of liability resulting from a reporting
statute, and those that provide for reasonable care in hiring are just and
equitable. But again, as with criminal laws, the sanctity of constitutional
safeguards regarding religion and fundamental rights should not fall victim
to emotion.
Every author, judge, physician or researcher writing about pedophilia ad-
mits that the issue is complicated and charged with emotion. Recently there
has been an effort on the part of state government to stop pedophilia through
expansion of reporting requirements and elimination of reporting privileges.
This is the gist of the present predicament facing clergy. But we have also
seen a number of clerics indicted and convicted of pedophilia itself; these
convictions heighten the emotion of the predicament. There has also been
revelations concerning the medical condition of the pedophile and the call to
address the person with dignity. This confronts the cleric's predicament
with a dilemma: giving in to the desire to prevent the abuse or providing a
chance for the abuser to be forgiven and begin a process of firm resolve not
to sin again through treatment. This dilemma is probably being confronted
at this moment. The point of this Article and of the many changes that have
come about through medicine, law and society in recent years is to demand
that all concerned work together in reason to promote the greatest good.
